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RECONSIDERING PREJUDICE IN
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FOR BLACK WORK MATTERS
Michael Z. Green*
ABSTRACT
In the 1985 foundational article Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Richard Delgado
and his co-authors identified major concerns with the growing use of alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve disputes involving people of
color. The seminal findings from that article highlighted the power differ-
entials exacerbated by informal dispute resolution, and the article contrib-
uted immediately to a surge of robust critiques of the increasing use of
alternative dispute resolution for those most vulnerable in our society.
More than thirty years after the Delgado article, a community of
respected and prominent ADR and discrimination scholars, assembled in
panels at a symposium sponsored by the SMU Law Review in February
2017, explored the continued impact of ADR on disempowered disputants
by analyzing discrete areas within the ADR process. Joined by keynote
remarks from Professor Delgado as he reflected on his 1985 article, these
scholars have provided an updated and valuable contribution as a new mil-
lennium critique of ADR based upon prejudice.
As part of the scholarly reflections involved in this modern critique of
ADR, this Article explores the concern of racial prejudice in using ADR in
the workplace. This Black Lives Matter era has led to several situations
where workplace disputes have arisen with respect to discussions about
race. Employers have started to recognize that they must better prepare to
handle workplace disputes related to race as a result of more protest and
discussion due to the Black Lives Matter movement.
This Article examines a high-profile agreement between an employer
and a union to provide a dispute resolution process to help its diverse em-
ployees resolve workplace disputes. The Article asserts that black employ-
ees can find racial justice in a workplace that uses a modified merger of the
mediation and arbitration program developed by those parties. That pro-
cess ameliorates many of the concerns about informality and prejudice that
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Delgado and his co-authors first expressed in 1985. As opposed to the dis-
mal results in the courts, this ADR process provides a much more viable
opportunity for black employees to resolve discrimination matters in a dig-
nified way that respects employee voice and offers procedural justice in the
workplace. As a result, all three of the key stakeholders, including employ-
ers, unions, and black workers, can embrace this merged mediation and
arbitration program as a positive dispute resolution process.
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I. INTRODUCTION: RECONSIDERING PREJUDICE IN ADR
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUMALTHOUGH there have been some efforts to make a compre-
hensive evaluation of the impact of alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR), many of those studies were conducted quite a long
time ago. In a landmark study published in 1985, Professor Richard Del-
gado and his co-authors used social science research to analyze the use of
ADR to resolve disputes involving people of color and women.' Accord-
ing to Delgado and his co-authors, being forced to pursue ADR denies
persons of color and women the application of certain norms and rules of
procedure available in a court trial, including "the flag, the black robes,
the ritual-[to] remind those present that the occasion calls for the
higher, 'public' values, rather than the lesser values embraced during mo-
ments of informality and intimacy." 2 Under Delgado's analysis, the "for-
mality of adversarial adjudication deters prejudice" because it counters
"bias among legal decisionmakers and disputants" and it "strengthen[s]
the resolve of minority disputants to pursue their legal rights."3 These
"[f]ormal rules also counter decisionmaker bias or consideration of extra-
neous issues."4
On the other hand, Delgado has recognized that increasing concerns
regarding the attainment of racial justice in the courts as a result of a
"right-wing surge [in] this country" may establish that "[t]he equation of
'higher' values with the public sphere is . . . not necessarily[ ] true" be-
cause "[m]any conservative judges and mean-spirited laws have been put
in place." 5 As a result, one could surmise that "[i]f the public resolution
of workplace discrimination through the courts does not represent a fair
option, then the private resolution of these disputes ... may offer a viable
option . . . for employees, employers, and unions." 6
Although Delgado's article highlighted that many factors from social
science and psychoanalytical studies-including "scapegoating, economic
dislocation, power disparities, socialization, and in-group/out-group cog-
1. See Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985); see also Susan K. Hippensteele, Revisiting the Promise of
Mediation for Employment Discrimination Claims, 9 PE-PP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 211, 243(2009) (stating "Delgado's hypothesis has support from social scientific studies on decision-
making and emotion.").
2. Delgado, supra note 1. at 1388.
3. Id. at 1388-89.
4. Id. at 1400 n.307.
5. See Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Conflict as Pathology: An
Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1391 n.1, 1399-1400 (1997) (quoting both
Delgado and his alter ego Rodrigo). But see Phyllis E. Bernard, Minorities, Mediation and
Method: The View from One Court-Connected Mediation Program, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1, 4-13 (2008) (disagreeing with Delgado's original concerns about informality in alterna-
tives to the court and asserting that those concerns are not valid).
6. See Michael Z. Green, Reading Ricci and Pyett to Provide Racial Justice Through
Union Arbitration, 87 IND. L.J. 367, 378-79 (2012).
SMU LAW REVIEW
nitive categories-contribute to the development of prejudice" in resolv-
ing disputes,7 it also seemed to contribute immediately to a swell of
robust critiques over the next ten years about the increasing use of ADR
for those who are more vulnerable in our society.8 Even so, in 1996, a
mere eleven years after the Delgado article, Eric Yamamoto lamented
the relatively small number of mainstream law review articles critiquing
ADR based on prejudice. 9 More than thirty years after the Delgado arti-
cle and twenty years after the Yamamoto article, the time has come to
explore the continued impact of ADR on disempowered participants.
With new views now being recently expressed by Professor Delgado
about the possibilities for ADR in light of the troubling aspects of racial
discrimination still ever-present in our society,10 now is an excellent time
7. Delgado et al., supra note 1, at 1382.
8. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1, 31-47, 55 (1987) (comparing quality of adjudication versus ADR);
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 668, 682 (1986) (asserting that some "important constitutional and public law issues"
should be resolved by courts and not by ADR); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-50 (1991) (expressing concerns
about family mediation in coercing women to resolve disputes to their detriment); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settle-
ment Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 511 (1985) (referring to how some cases involve
issues that should not be subject to trade-offs via settlement or ADR because of the impor-
tance of the substantive outcomes, such as in employer-employee disputes and some civil
rights cases); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 OIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
1, 7-14 (1993) (criticizing ADR as infected with notions of coercive harmony); Judith Res-
nik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10
Omo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211, 249 (1995) (recognizing informality of ADR differs from
formalism of the courts but suggesting the satisfaction with informality of ADR represents
more of a criticism of the courts); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal
Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482, 590 (1987)
(finding informality of mediation problematic when bargaining power differentials are pre-
sent). Although another article published shortly before the Delgado article also contrib-
uted significantly to the critique of ADR. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (asserting that settlement and other forms of ADR are problematic
because of concerns about coercion without judicial involvement in the process); see also
Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117
(2009) (discussing the impact of the Fiss 1984 article). One of the more important articles
on unfairness in the disputing system for those who are disempowered was published al-
most ten years earlier. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Specula-
tions on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 95, 123-24, 137 (1974) (referring
to concerns where a dispute resolution system such as the courts may have the perception
of an unjust system that is designed only for the "haves" in our society to the exclusion of
the "have-nots").
9. See Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where have the Critics Gone? 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1055, 1065, 1067 (1996). Yamamoto has updated this critique as part of this sympo-
sium. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Procedure: ADR and the Justices' "Second Wave"
Constriction of Court Access and Claim Development, 70 SMU L. REv. 765 (2017) (discuss-
ing a restrictive approach to procedure couched in increasing us of ADR through com-
pelled, private arbitration).
10. See Richard Delgado, The Unbearable Lightness of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Critical Thoughts on Fairness and Formality, 70 SMU L. REv. 611 (2017) (referring to
concerns about major forces currently pressing society to greater levels of inequality and
noting that as the courts and the law have been used to try and rescue endangered groups,
empowered predators have been alerted and responded to make the formal system poten-
tially even more discriminatory than the informal system of ADR); see also Richard Del-
[Vol. 70642
Reconsidering Prejudice
for a modem critique of ADR based upon prejudice. This Article offers a
new millennium reconsideration of the prejudicial impact of ADR as
stated in Delgado's article and focuses on race in the workplace.
In Section II, this Article examines the unique issues presented by our
current racial climate when using ADR in the workplace for black em-
ployees, including examining aspects of negotiation, mediation, and arbi-
tration of race discrimination issues. Section III discusses a high-profile
agreement between an employer and a union that seeks to provide a fair
dispute resolution process that merges mediation and arbitration while
aimed at helping employees who have been discriminated against in the
workplace resolve their statutory claims outside of the courts. Section III
also suggests some modifications to that dispute resolution process to en-
sure the disputes may be resolved by diverse mediators and arbitrators
and the employees have reasonable opportunities for legal representation
and voice. Section IV explains why such a merger of fair mediation and
arbitration procedures negotiated by a union committed to racial justice
can adequately address the concerns of all stakeholders, including em-
ployees, unions, and employers. Section V concludes that the prejudice
issues Delgado raised more than thirty years ago must still continue to be
analyzed for both ADR and court systems used to resolve worker dis-
crimination claims based on race in today's Black Lives Matter climate.
II. ADR IN THE WORKPLACE WHILE BLACK
Black employees have the statutory right under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)11 to be free from discrimination in the
workplace based upon race.1 2 Most Title VII charges of workplace dis-
crimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) from 1997 to 2014 were based on race.' 3 Nevertheless, a recent
study indicates the increasing lack of court success at the pleading stage
when pursuing race discrimination claims in the workplace and how white
judges were more willing to dismiss black pro se plaintiffs' claims of em-
ployment discrimination as compared with black judges. 1 4 A 2016 na-
tional survey conducted by Pew Research Center also found that while
gado and Jean Stefancic, The Hole-in-the-Wall Gang View of Life and America's Racial
Future, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 748 (2016) ("Our thesis is that the country's chang-
ing demographic composition will create increasing anxieties and turmoil . .. [and] ...
whites will not readily accept second-place status in a diversifying population and
economy.").
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (Title VII is codi-
fied as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-17 (2014)).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2014) (prohibiting discrimination because of race
in addition to color, national origin, religion, and sex).
13. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An Empirical
Analysis, 101 MiNN. L. REv. 907, 921 (2017).
14. See George A. Martinez, Further Thoughts on Race, American Law, and the State
of Nature: Advancing the Multiracial Paradigm Shift and Seeking Patterns in the Area of
Race and Law, 85 UMKC L. REv. 105, 112 (2016) (citing Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond
Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal's Effect of Claims of Race Discrimi-
nation, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 36-39 (2011)).
2017] 643
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64% of black adults believe they are treated less fairly than whites in the
workplace, only 22% of whites agree (a difference of 42 percentage
points).15 As a result, in recent years, employees seeking to address race
discrimination claims have been pushed to recast their claims as a race-
neutral concern, as courts and the public have started to believe that
"race discrimination is rare and race-based protections are no longer
necessary." 16
Despite a strong desire to have voice in the workplace,17 empirical
studies demonstrate that employees facing workplace discrimination "do
not always exercise voice" out of a "fear [of] retaliation for their com-
plaints, and retaliation protections are inadequate to overcome this muz-
zle to worker voice."' 8 Further, critical race theory demonstrates that
black employees are subjected to unique forms of discrimination in the
workplace based on covering identity, implicit bias, institutional racism,
and intersectional forms of discrimination that do not fit easily within the
parameters of Title VII's protections.19
Because many scholars 20 have questioned the feasibility of pursuing lit-
15. See On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites are Worlds Apart, PEw
RES. CTR. 5 (June 27, 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/
06/ST_2016.06.27_Race-Inequality-Final.pdf [https://perma.cclM9RR-UFWU].
16. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Zev Eigen & Camille Gear Rich, Post-Racial Hydrau-
lics: The Hidden Dangers of the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016).
17. See Thomas A. Kochan, Rethinking and Reframing U.S. Policy on Worker Voice
and Representation, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 233 (2011); see also Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive
Reform, 94 MARo. L. REv. 765, 805 (2011) (referring to "a variety of theories suggesting"
the value of "giving workers a say in the workplace"); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is
"(Im)partial Enough" in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 Aluz. L. REV. 395, 424 (2010)
(describing the importance of allowing participants "to tell their stories ('voice')" as part of
the perceptions of fairness and procedural justice in assessing a dispute resolution system).
18. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REv. 605, 620
n.85 (2017) (citing Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MNN. L. REv. 18, 20, 37 n.58 (2005)).
19. See Lauren B. Edelman, Aaron C. Smyth & Asad Rahim, Legal Discrimination:
Empirical Sociolegal and Critical Race Perspectives on Antidiscrimination Law, 12 ANN.
REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 395, 400-02 (2016). Professor Elayne Greenberg has suggested a com-
prehensive ADR system design based upon recognizing that implicit bias discrimination in
the workplace does not fit with court dispute resolution. See Elayne E. Greenberg, Fitting
the Forum to the Pernicious Fuss: A Dispute System Design to Address Implicit Bias and
'Isms in the Workplace, 17 CARDozo J. CoNFLicr RESOL. 75, 100 (2015) (suggesting the
development of a reconciliation-focused dispute resolution system specifically aimed at
handling implicit bias claims of discrimination in the workplace with education about im-
plicit bias, a transformative mediation focus, and an assessment accountability).
20. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 909 n.8 (using the following citations as support:
"Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. C.R. & C.L. 223,
247-49 (2014) (summarizing barriers to Title VII plaintiffs). There is also an extensive
body of empirical literature on the poor chances of Title VII plaintiffs in federal courts. See
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 132 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont
& Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1
J. EMPnucAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983 (1991);
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination
Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary Empirical Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTs AND REAUTIEs 261 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert
L. Nelson eds., 2005); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mo-
[Vol. 70644
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igation to resolve discrimination claims in the workplace, some have sug-
gested the use of ADR as a more viable option. 21 However, as Professor
Theresa Beiner explained in 2014, some study of how ADR affects work-
place disputes should be attempted before rushing to use it instead of the
courts for employment discrimination claims:
Unfortunately, there is no way to know how methods of alternative
dispute resolution-arbitration, mediation, settlement, or internal
employer grievance mechanisms-are actually working. Most of
these alternative dispute resolution systems are not studied and scru-
tinized by professionals. They exist 'in the shadow of the law,' as
commentators suggest. There is no realistic way to know if these al-
ternative dispute resolution mechanisms are bringing about just re-
sults. In addition, these mechanisms do not alert employers and
employees to what is and is not acceptable workplace behavior.22
Within the last few years, the prominence of racial issues in our society
has been highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement, which started
as a response to the killings of black men in Ferguson, Missouri; New
York, New York; Charleston, South Carolina; Baltimore, Maryland; and
several other cities.23 The Black Lives Matter movement has led to sev-
eral situations where workplace disputes have arisen with respect to dis-
cussions about race.24 Labor activists and the Black Lives Matter
bilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post-Civil Rights United States, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010)").
21. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Many Lanes Out of Court: Against Privatization
of Employment Discrimination Disputes, 73 MD. L. REV. 837, 837-39 (2014) (referring to
criticism of federal courts by "[miany scholars" regarding "lackluster enforcement of em-
ployment discrimination laws" as suggesting "that out-of-court processes may better serve
the aims of anti-discrimination laws.").
22. Id. at 840 (footnotes omitted).
23. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist
Pedagogy and the Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 385-86, n.15 (2015) ("'Black Lives Matter'
was first coined by two black women, Alicia Garza and Patrisse Cullors, in response to
George Zimmerman's being found not guilty in the killing of Trayvon Martin.") (citing
Nishat Kurwa, "Black Lives Matter" Slogan Becomes a Bigger Movement, NPR (Dec. 4,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/04/368408247/black-lives-matter-slogan-becomes-a-big-
ger-movement [https://perma.cc/M8V6-YCF5]); Nicole D. Porter, Expanding Public Safety
in the Era of Black Lives Matter, 70 MIAMI L. REV. 533, 535 n.3 (2016) ("Black Lives
Matter is a social justice movement and social media framework (#BlackLivesMatter)
founded in the United States that started after the July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmer-
man in the shooting death of Florida teenager Trayvon Martin. The movement was further
animated by the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The social justice
organizers who conceived the term, Black Lives Matter, have asserted that it reinforces
that African American lives, often viewed without value, are important."). The Black Lives
Matter movement website states that this movement was created "after Trayvon Martin's
murderer, George Zimmerman, was acquitted for his crime, and dead 17-year old Trayvon
was posthumously placed on trial for his own murder." About, BLACK LIVES MATTER,
http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/6N7S-Z67A] (last visited Oct. 24,
2017); see also John Eligon, One Slogan, Many Methods: Black Lives Matter Enters Politics,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/one-slogan-many-
methods-black-lives-matter-enters-politics.html?_r=1. [Perma link unavailable] (describing
origins of the Black Lives Matter movement and its decentralized and spreading
organization).
24. See, e.g., Daniel Craig, Employee at Philly Hospital Loses Job over Racially
Charged Facebook Post, Philly Voice (July 14, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/em-
2017] 645
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movement have joined forces as part of a Black Lives Matter at Work
coalition that uses the hashtag #BlackWorkMatters. 25 Employers have
ployee-philly-hospital-fired-over-racially-charged-facebook-post/ [https://perma.cc/G5S4-
KV98] (referring to Diane Amoratis, a hospital nurse, who was terminated for posting a
Facebook post that stated, among other things, that "Blacks kill each other every day, all
day long, and it's ok with them. Why no protest when Jamal kills Kalif???? Well, I AM
WHITE AND PROUD TO BE WHITE!! WHITE LIVES MATTER!!!! POLICE LIVES
MATTER!!! Keep your circus in your own neighborhood!!! Get a life, a honest job, and
RAISE YOUR KIDS TO BE PRODUCTIVE CITIZENS!!!! I am sick and tired of all this
bulls*** with the black people!"); Michael Kagan, The Public Defender's Pin: Untangling
Free Speech Regulation in the Courtroom, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. ONLINE 125, 126 (2017)
(discussing Ohio public defender, Andrea Burton, who settled a contempt of court case
where she agreed not to wear a "Black Lives Matter" pin on the condition that police
officers were prohibited from wearing black armbands commemorating slain officers); Ei-
leen Keithly, Black Employee Says Georgetown Restaurant Owner Fired Her for Support-
ing Black Lives Matter Marchers, SouTH STRAND NEWS (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www
.southstrandnews.com/news/black-employee-says-georgetown-restaurant-owner-fired-her-
for-supporting/article_389cfc35-aal4-5dd3-8d90-98c3cdc98deO.html [https://perma.cc/
KKP5-U9N9] (describing a restaurant worker, Kiana Knowlin, who was fired by the res-
taurant's owner for supporting a Black Lives Matter protest march passing by the restau-
rant); Joshua Rhett Miller, UVA Instructor Out After Comparing Black Lives Matter to
KKK, NY POST (Oct. 10, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/10/10/professor-takes-leave-after-
comparing-black-lives-matter-to-kkk/ [https://perma.cc/9R5M-3V8S] (referring to Univer-
sity of Virginia Lecturer, Douglas Muir, who "agreed to take leave" after comparing Black
Lives Matter to the Ku Klux Klan); Ken Ritter, Defense Attorney Sparks "Black Lives"
Protest in Vegas Court, AP NEWS (Sep. 21, 2016), https://apnews.com/f08l2b2O6ffa4385ae
31da44f05e7281/defense-attorney-sparks-black-lives-protest-vegas-court; [https://perma.cc/
8M48-DUQ3] (referring to Erika Ballou, public defender, who was asked to remove Black
Lives Matter button while in court); Kathryn Schroeder, Teacher Fired After Wearing
"Black Lives Matter" Button, SocIETY: OPPOSING VIws (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.oppos-
ingviews.com/ilsociety/75-year-old-teacher-wears-pin-class-immediately-banned-school;
[https://perma.cc/D5AA-B6NX] (describing how 75-year old who taught as a substitute
teacher for fifteen years was fired after wearing a "Black Lives Matter" button in class);
Brandon Scott, Jefferson Co. Employee Fired for Black Lives Matter Post, BEAUMONT EN-
TERPRISE (July 20, 2016), http://www.beaumontenterprise.comlnews/article/County-em-
ployee-goes-on-social-media-tirade-8388312.php [https://perma.cc/5JR2-7LXN] (referring
to Patricia Kloefkorn, coordinator for State District Judge Raquel West, who was termi-
nated for Facebook post stating that Black Lives Matter protestors should get a job and
that "since when did being black . .. give you the right to shoot people."); Dave Urbanski,
"F*** Black Lives Matter": Firefighter Out of a Job After Posting Racist Remarks on
Facebook, THE BLAZE (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.theblaze.com/news/2016/12/14/f-black-
lives-matter-firefighter-out-of-a-job-after-posting-racist-remarks-on-facebook/ [Perma link
unavailable] (describing Ryan Hudson, a Michigan fire fighter, who was terminated after
posting racist speech about Black Lives Matter on Facebook).
25. See Greg Chern, Black Lives Matter at Work: New Report Offers Resources for
Labor Activists to Fight White Supremacy, IN THESE TIMEs: WORKING IN THESE TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18447/black-lives-matter-labor-
movement [https://perma.ccl3QL3-ADY3] (describing Young Workers Media Project call-
ing for solidarity with Black Lives Matter movement and worker groups while compiling
stories of worker organizing and interviews with young labor activists of color along with
reflections from fast food workers at the frontlines of protest); see also Jessica Dickerson,
Citizens Stand for Economic Equality With #BlackWorkMatters and #Fightforl5, BLACK
VOICEs: HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/
black-work-matters-15_n_7071946.html?utmhpref=black-voices [https://perma.cclXR8L-
W9KA] (describing hashtag #BlackWorkMatters campaign as also known as the Fight for
15 which has focused on nationwide effort to obtain a minimum wage of $15 per hour while
recognizing the disproportionate number of young black people who work in low wage
jobs); OIC OF AMERICA, Black Work Matters: Race, Poverty and the Future of Work in
Philadelphia, https://www.uniteherephilly.org/wp-content/uploads/Black-Work-Matters-
Report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/Y92C-BMFZ] (discussing benefits of Unite Here Union in
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started to recognize that they must be better prepared to handle work-
place disputes related to race as a result of more protest and discussion
due to the Black Lives Matter movement. 26
A. NEGOTIATING WHILE BLACK2 7
Despite the significance of the Delgado article in 1985, even ten years
later, two scholars acknowledged that "few" empirical studies had at-
tempted to prove the prejudice concerns with informality in ADR.28
Now, Cynthia Mabry did express concerns for blacks in negotiations as
far back as 1998 when discussing existing empirical work:
Empirical studies have shown that race affects negotiations. For ex-
ample, when adversaries are members of the same race, they bargain
more cooperatively with one another. Same-race disputants are more
cooperative because they trust each other more easily than they trust
people of different racial groups. In contrast, intercultural adversa-
ries endeavor to 'maintain a certain face or posture in the eyes of
someone different.' This posturing influences the parties' efforts to
solve their problem.29
Philadelphia and how that union addresses racial inequality for workers in the hospitality
industry).
26. See Jessica Guynn, Zuckerberg Reprimands Facebook Staff Defacing "Black Lives
Matter", USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/02/
25/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-black-lives-matter-diversity/80933694/ [https://perma.cc/
7GWF-AAZH] (describing how Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg responded forcefully
after employees crossed out Black Lives Matter and wrote All Lives Matter on the walls of
the company's campus by launching an investigation, stating that those communications
represented a "deeply hurtful and tiresome experience for the black community," and
mentioning the comments were "unacceptable" to him and he was "very disappointed by
this disrespectful behavior"); see also Nicole Cozier, Black Lives Matter at Work as Much
as Everywhere Else: AT&T and Ben & Jerry's Set Example, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.hrc.org/blog/black-lives-matter-at-work-as-much-as-every-
where-else-att-and-ben-jerrys-se. [https://perma.cc/02N5-XPQM] (describing how leaders
of prominent businesses such as AT&T and Ben & Jerry's have affirmed the necessity and
relevance of the Black Lives Matter movement). But see Laura Donovan, An Email About
"Handling" Workplace Diversity Is Facing Heavy Scrutiny, ArrN (Aug. 31, 2016), https://
www.attn.com/stories/11073/controversy-over-email-about-handling-workplace-diversity
[https://perma.cclYU72-A44P] (describing responses of activist and educator, Britany
Packnett, who was outraged by a webinar that cast doubt on racial bias in the workplace
and insulted by its suggested need for training on how to respond to people involved in the
Black Lives Matter movement).
27. The text of Section II(A) was, in substantial part, first published as Michael Z.
Green, Negotiating While Black, in THE NEGOTIATOR's DESK REFERENCE ch. 41
(Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, eds., DRI Press 2017).
28. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gen-
der on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 767, 769-70 (1996) ("Despite widespread concern about potential bias against minor-
ities and women in informal dispute resolution processes, there have been surprisingly few
empirical efforts to validate or disprove the existence and severity of bias. Cross-cultural
studies have been restricted to surveys on procedural preference in hypothetical disputes
and anthropological observations on nonindustrialized societies.") (citations omitted).
29. See Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans "Are Not Carbon Copies" of White
Americans-The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 405, 420 (1998) (quoting Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal
Negotiation and Settlement, in NEGOTIATION: WINNING TACTICS AND TECHNiQUEs 81, 126
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 347, 1988)).
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Many of the prominent studies that look at what it means to negotiate
while being black have been conducted by Professor Ian Ayres. In a 1991
study, with a first report in 1991,30 and then further analysis in a new and
expanded audit of that study with resulting data and conclusions reported
in 1995,31 Ayres examined differences based upon race by using pairs of
testers, always including a white male versus someone of a different race,
who were all trained to negotiate the same way and sent to purchase a
new car at randomly selected Chicago auto dealerships. 32 Ayres found
that black buyers were induced to pay much higher prices due to both the
initial offer they received from the salesperson and also the final offer
which represented the lowest price offered by the salesperson after a
number of rounds of bargaining.33 Specific results demonstrated that
"[b]lack female testers were asked to pay over three times the markup of
white male testers, and black male testers were asked to pay over twice
the white male markup." 34 Ayres also found that salespersons believed
that white males had better search details and were more informed about
the dealer's actual costs than black purchasers.35
Ayres has even more recently noted, in a 2011 unpublished paper with
co-authors Mahzarin R. Banaji and Christine Jolls, that more nuanced
and technical forms of negotiating, such as through electronic bartering
and auction services like eBay, have also indicated biased results for
black persons.36 Ayres and his co-authors constructed a field experiment
30. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotia-
tions, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 856 (1991) (describing salespersons were more likely to
negotiate price of a new car with white purchasers versus black persons as 61% of black
persons did not know that car sticker prices are negotiable versus only 31% of white per-
sons who did not know the prices were negotiable); see also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman,
Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 ECON. REV. 304, 312-13
(1995) (further confirming findings from 1991 study and suggesting that the reasons why
blacks were subjected to much higher prices than whites during negotiations).
31. Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Esti-
mates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995) [hereinafter, Ayres, Further Evidence].
32. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 305.
33. Ayres, supra note 30, at 819, 830 ("The tests reveal that white males receive signifi-
cantly better prices than blacks . . . "); Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 319 ("In
negotiations for more than 300 new cars, Chicago car dealers offered black and female
testers significantly higher prices than white males with whom they were paired, even
though all testers used identical bargaining strategies."); Ayres, Further Evidence, supra
note 31, at 116 ("The current study confirms the original study's findings that offers to
black males and black females are significantly higher than those made to white males.").
34. Ayres, supra note 30, at 828.
35. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 317 (describing assumptions about lack of
information among blacks and whites having a lower reservation price (the maximum
amount the buyer was willing to pay) could have led to disparity in offers for automobile
purchases based on race); Ayers, supra note 30, at 848-49 (referring to reasoning as to why
car dealerships would charge white males less based upon assumed higher search costs for
blacks and women). The Ayres studies did not address discrimination in automobile loan
financing because the script for those testers required that they inform the dealerships that
the testers would provide their own financing. Ayres, supra note 30, at 823 n.22.
36. See Ian Ayres, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Christine Jolls, Race Effects on eBay (Sep.
27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1934432 [https://perma.cc/4VDF-4N2F] and http://works.bepress.comlian-ay-
res/23/ [https://perma.cc/EWB2-3WKW].
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to test the effects of race on transactions involving baseball card auctions
on eBay. The tester elements involved a display of photographs showing
the same cards being "held by either a dark-skinned/African American
hand or a light-skinned/Caucasian hand."37 Their results indicated that
the "[c]ards held by African-American sellers sold for approximately
20% ($0.90) less than the cards held by Caucasian sellers."38
A similar study on the effects of race in negotiations was created by
Jennifer Doleac and Luke Stein in the online sale of an Apple iPod.39
These researchers "posted classified advertisements offering an iPod
Nano portable digital music player for sale on several hundred locally
focused websites throughout the US" and signaled race by the skin color
of the hand holding a picture of the iPod being offered for sale in the
advertisement.40 This study differed somewhat from the Ayres eBay
study because the eBay parties would never expect to meet and the
purchases through eBay were insured by eBay. The participants in the
iPod study would expect to meet in person to close the deal, and there
was no insurance involved.41
The Doleac and Stein study specifically used pictures of a man's black
hand, or a man's white hand, or a man's white hand with a tattoo, each
holding a new, unopened iPod Nano.42 Potential buyers responded via
anonymized e-mail addresses. There was no formal bidding process and
"either party [could] cease communication at any time without facing any
consequences." 4 3 About two hours after each advertisement was posted,
the researchers sent an e-mail to each responder stating they received
numerous responses and asked for their best offers.44 From these results,
Doleac and Stein concluded: "Black sellers receive 18% fewer offers than
white sellers, whereas tattooed sellers receive 16% fewer." 45 Also, with
respect to amounts, the mean offer received was $49.86 and maximum
offer of $54.05.46 But, "[c]ompared with white sellers, black sellers re-
ceive average offers of $5.72 (11%) lower and tattooed sellers $5.53
(10%) lower." 47
Further, Doleac and Stein concluded that the best offers both "[b]lack
and tattooed sellers" received were "also lower than whites' by $7.07
(12%) and $6.60 (11%), respectively." 4 8 Final conclusions from Doleac
and Stein were that "black sellers suffer worse market outcomes than
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at Abstract.
39. See Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand Race and Online
Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F469 (2013).
40. Id. at F470.
41. Id. at F472.
42. Id. at F476.
43. Id. at F474.
44. Id. at F477.
45. Id. at F482.
46. Id. at F484.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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their white counterparts," including the receipt of "13% fewer responses
and 18% fewer offers," and these negative results were "similar in magni-
tude to those associated with a seller's display of a wrist tattoo." 49 Also,
this study found that "black sellers do better in markets with larger black
populations, suggesting that the disparities may be driven, in part, by buy-
ers' preference for their own-race sellers."50
A 2013 unpublished study of professionals at a business conference,
who all made more than $50,000 per year, involved asking them certain
questions about negotiation of their salary offers as part of a job scena-
rio.5 1 The participants included both men and women and whites and
blacks, and all were asked under the scenario how they would respond if
they believed the person they were negotiating with was prejudiced
against them.52 The survey's responses indicated that black professional
women were less willing to negotiate salary with individuals they per-
ceived as biased or prejudiced.53
Similarly, with respect to further issues in workplace negotiations while
black, 5 4 a study in March 2000 by Marc-David Seidel, Jeffrey Polzer, and
Katherine Stewart found that black professionals negotiate less beneficial
salary and benefit agreements than whites.5 5 Seidel, Polzer, and Stewart
noted that "'[d]iscriminatory wage differences between White and minor-
ity employees have been documented in many organizations." 56 These
authors recognized several potential causes for this wage discrimination
including overt organizational hostility based on race, manifested by ef-
forts to cabin certain lower positions for minorities, as well as specifically
choosing to give unequal pay for equal work.57
Seidel and his co-authors also decided to investigate whether salary ne-
gotiations may be infected by white assumptions that initial offers could
be made lower to black applicants because they had less information
about whether the employee's salary was negotiable and what the com-
pany's reservation price might be.58 Also, this same study raised the ques-
49. Id. at F490.
50. Id. at F491.
51. See Erika V. Hall, Evan P. Apfelbaum & Leigh Thompson, Seeing Racism and
Forecasting Worth: Perceived Prejudice Decreases Blacks' Propensity to Negotiate (2013)
(unpublished) (results discussed at Leigh Thompson, Negotiation Theory and Research:
Gender and Diversity, March 2013, at Slides 21-28, available at http://bsddiversity.uchicago
.edu/sites/bsddiversity.uchicago.edufiles/uploads/2013%2003%20UC%20Diversity%20ne
gotiate%206Leigh%20PDF.pdf) [https://perma.cc/7PR4-ZJLJ] and https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=2aHtwLEg8R4&list=UU-FLdSMY1eGwn%20pzA8e4qHw&index=1
[https://perma.cc/5ES3-DF7U], videotape at 52:22-1:07:35 time).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. A more detailed analysis of workplace negotiations while black is discussed
through a detailed hypothetical in Green, Negotiating While Black, supra note 27, at 7-11.
55. Marc-David L. Seidel, Jeffrey T. Polzer & Katherine J. Stewart, Friends in High
Places: The Effects of Social Networks on Discrimination in Salary Negotiations, 45 ADMiN.
Sci. Q. 1, 1-24 (March 2000).
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3.
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tion of whether direct racial bias by the company negotiator would make
him less likely to give salary increases. 59 The authors also identified a
concern about whether cultural differences in negotiating norms might
explain the reason for lower salaries. 60
Seidel and his co-authors tested their hypothesis that "[m]embers of
racial minority groups will negotiate smaller increases to their initial sal-
ary offers than their White counterparts." 61 The authors also noted that
"information about the employing organization may provide an advan-
tage to a job candidate attempting to negotiate a higher starting salary." 62
More specifically, the authors described "[o]ne of the most useful sources
of tailored, timely information may be a personal relationship with some-
one in the company, which can provide sensitive information that is not
available to other sources." 63 Thus, social networks play a huge role in
negotiation, and black persons with lesser social contacts than their white
counterparts are disadvantaged by the impact of those social networks.
As Seidel and his co-authors explained, the information that could be
helpful in a salary negotiation would
include the organization's concessions in negotiations with previous
job candidates, the potential negative consequences associated with
pushing harder for further concessions, the range of starting salaries
granted by the organization to similarly qualified past hires, the
strength of the organization's preferences across the multiple issues
being negotiated (e.g., salary, benefits), the organization's time
frame for the hiring decision, the organization's alternative job can-
didates, and the organization's norms for conducting negotiations
(e.g., which individual the candidate should approach to request a
higher salary).64
A union as a social or business network or an identity caucus within a
union might be able to help negotiate on behalf of black employees to
help address the information imbalance.
However, black persons have unique issues that may arise in their
workplace negotiations. There is an inherent concern or fear that one's
actions in negotiations to obtain certain workplace benefits will reinforce
negative stereotypes. By affecting the negotiating posture of a black
worker in this way, Professor Claude Steele has referred to this concern
or fear that one's actions will reinforce negative stereotypes as stereotype
threat.65 A black worker has an unusual worry about producing stereo-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3, 10.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air, How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Iden-
tity and Performance, 52 Am. PSYCHOL. 613, 614 (1997) (referring to how the existence of
negative stereotypes about certain groups may arise where "members of these groups can
fear being reduced to that stereotype" to the point where "the threat of these stereotypes
can be sharply felt and, in several ways, hampers their achievement"); see also Elise K.
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type-confirming conversations if she pushes too hard in negotiating work-
place benefits.66 Specifically, "the existence of stereotypes diminishes an
employee's workplace bargaining power, and thus her ability to negoti-
ate" her own work terms. 67
And black persons, more likely than any other racial group, tend to
find themselves pressured to "cover" or conform to norms that deny their
racial identity at work.68 This form of covering in workplace negotiations
represents a tradeoff between the lesser of two evils related to racial ster-
eotyping. She must act against her own financial interest to lose the battle
for a higher negotiated salary in order to win the war of not losing out on
overall professional opportunities for being viewed as incompetent or un-
qualified or lazy based upon a racial stereotype.
A lot of negotiation theory derives from game theory, which "makes
no claims at offering powerful prescriptive advice for negotiations." 6 9
Any prescriptive approaches to negotiation have tended to counsel the
negotiators to emphasize "their and their opponents' underlying interests
rather than . . . positions."70 Overall, one of the biggest concerns that
should be addressed is the lack of information. One way for black persons
to obtain additional information for fairer negotiations can be through
receiving common information available to all parties, possibly through
posting it on the Internet and making sure that all parties have the same
information. But as the Seidel study explained, companies may be unwill-
ing to establish any policies aimed at correcting any information discrep-
ancies related to salary negotiations because it "would result in higher
payroll expenses." 7 ' Another way to improve the information disparity
Kalokerinos, Courtney von Hippel & Hannes Zacher, Is Stereotype Threat a Useful Con-
struct for Organizational Psychology Research and Practice?, 7 INDus. & ORGAN.
PSYCHOL. 382, 391-92 (2014) (describing how stereotype threat affects negotiation and
how affirmative action and other equal opportunity programs aimed at responding to dis-
criminatory prospects in the workplace can create stereotype threat among potential recip-
ients as suggesting they need help because their abilities are insufficient, even when they
have strong qualifications, as well as the possibility of stereotype threat for women faced
with family-friendly policies as not committed to work).
66. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gilati, Conversations at Work, 79 ORE. L. REV.
103, 109 (2000) (discussing challenges that people of color face due to workplace stereo-
types that make certain conversations at work more difficult and even limit the type of
work and opportunities these individuals may pursue).
67. Id. at 110.
68. See Kenji Yoshino & Christie Smith, Uncovering Talent: A New Model of Inclu-
sion, at 5-6 (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/
about-deloitte/us-inclusion-uncovering-talent-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS6M-5BPS]
(referring to data collected regarding "covering at work" and noting that "Black respon-
dents" constituted the "cohort that reported the highest degree of covering"); see also
Dorie Clark, Why So Few Women and Minorities at the Top? Here's the Real Reason,
FoRBEs (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2013/09/03/why-so-few-wo-
men-and-minorities-at-the-top-heres-the-real-reason/ [Perma link unavailable] (describing
Yoshino and Smith study).
69. Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 2 (2003).
70. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789,
1814 (2000).
71. Seidel et al., supra note 55, at 22.
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involves hiring more racially-diverse employees as a whole, so they can
provide a social network for sharing information with same-race appli-
cants. Unions also are able to balance the information sharing process for
racially diverse groups of employees.
With technological advances, the use of the Internet may also help re-
move information disparities through developing social and electronic
media networks that fairly disseminate information without consideration
of race. As mentioned earlier, the Ayres studies have shown that being
black represented a negative result in auto purchase negotiations. How-
ever, Fiona Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer, and Jorge Silva-Russo studied
an online referral service, Autobytel.com, to show that the use of that
Internet service helped to level the playing field in automobile car pricing
for minorities.72 The authors noted that despite African American and
Hispanic minorities probably being within the racial groups least likely to
use the Internet, their findings suggest that those minorities who do use
the Internet to assist with their auto purchases will benefit the most from
doing so. While establishing that disadvantaged minorities pay 2.0-2.3%
more for their cars than do white consumers, the authors found that this
minority premium can be explained with differences in nonracial
demographics and search costs between minority groups and whites.73
Then, the authors asserted that when obtaining information through the
Internet via a referral service like Autobytel.com where party
demographics are not known, this process eliminates most of the offline
minority premium.74
As a result, unless the black person in the negotiation has as much
information as a similar white counterpart, be it through social or In-
ternet networks or some other means, and the white person negotiating
with her focuses on excising any conscious and subconscious race-based
stereotypes from the process, negotiating while black, even in 2017 and
even with relatively well-meaning counterparts, means that unproductive
obstacles still exist. To the extent that companies do not find ways to ad-
dress the stereotype threat that leads racial minorities to "cover" at work
to protect themselves at their own expense in salary negotiations, those
companies will lose out on finding and nurturing productive black talent
in their workplace.75
72. See Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer & Jorge Silva-Russo, Consumer In-
formation and Price Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to
Women and Minorities?, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 8668,
2001, http://www.nber.org/papers/w8668.pdf. [https://perma.cc/6VJ9-ELTN].
73. See id. at 2.
74. Id. at 3.
75. See Michelle Marks & Crystal Harold, Who Asks and Who Receives in Salary Ne-
gotiation, 32 J. ORG. BEHAV. 371, 372 (2011) (referring to how perceptions of fairness in
job salary negotiation affect "job satisfaction and commitment" and eventually affect "per-
formance and turnover"); see also Yoshino & Smith, supra note 68, at 13 (describing a loss
of talent that results as covering "negatively impacts [on] individuals' sense of self' and
"their commitment to their organizations"); see also Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work:
Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REv. 379, 413-14
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Kenji Yoshino and Dorie Clark suggest that organizations adopt a
model that focuses on following four approaches to address covering in
the workplace which could also help address racial consequences in nego-
tiations: reflect, diagnose, analyze, and initiate.76 While acknowledging
that more study of stereotype threat involving racial minorities in the
workplace must be done, since most studies have focused on stereotype
threat for women, Elise Kalokerinos, Courtney von Hippel, and Hannes
Zacher have found that identity matching may help.77 The authors also
suggest a three-step approach in addressing stereotype threat in the
workplace: 1) focus on primary prevention; 2) diagnose and treat early
stages of stereotype threat before it has long-term consequences; and 3)
undo the consequences from those who have been subjected to stereo-
type threat.78
To capsulize these suggestions from Yoshino and Clark, Kalokerinos,
von Hippel, and Zacher, the best way to prevent covering and stereotype
threat from infecting workplace negotiations over key concerns such as
salary, a company should seek a very diverse leadership group providing
many examples of people who look like and reflect the background of the
black person negotiating with that company. Then, black persons can
identify with people who are successful and look and sound like them to
ease any apprehension about performing in a way that feeds into negative
stereotypes. Through mentoring networks, identity caucuses, or unions,
black persons can meet similar role models who provide a positive reflec-
tion and offer social or business information to level the negotiating play-
ing field. These groups help combat the application of negative
stereotypes and also encourage self-affirming opportunities to show that
negative stereotypes do not match the individual black person involved.
B. MEDIATING WHILE BLACK 7 9
Isabelle Gunning has explained the problem that sometimes arises in
mediation for black persons occurs "when 'minority' group members in-
(2008) (describing how covering involves suppressing "signals of identification with socially
salient groups.").
76. Yoshino & Smith, supra note 68, at 15-16.
77. See Kalokerinos et al., supra note 65, at 381-82, 384, 387 (describing how stereo-
type threat can result in "unfavorable job attitudes, disidentification or disengagement at
work, altered decision making, and lowered career aspirations").
78. Id. at 395; see also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Catherin H. Tinsley, Sandra Chelde-
lin & Emily T. Amanatullah, Likeability v. Competence: The Impossible Choice Faced by
Female Politicians, Attenuated by Lawyers, 17 DUKE J. GENDER & POL'Y 363, 382 (2010)
(arguing that women should fight the stereotype as a response by mentally refraining the
negotiation as a group based negotiation rather than as an individual one).
79. Concerns about mediation of employment discrimination disputes for
disempowered employees have been addressed by several scholars. See, e.g., Mijha
Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant Is Not an
Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate Treatment and Unjustified
Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225, 284-92 (2003) (asserting that
mediation, despite its faults, is better for resolving employment discrimination disputes
than litigation); Emily M. Calhoun, Workplace Mediation: The First-Phase, Private Caucus
in Individual Discrimination Disputes, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 187, 209-10 (2004)
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teract with 'majority' group members in mediation where the results that
minority members get are arguably less just than if they went to court."80
By its nature, mediation provides dignity and self-determination for black
employees because they are able to articulate their concerns to the medi-
ator and to the employer that is the source of the conflict, and the em-
ployee must agree to whatever resolution is pursued.8 1 Still, just having
dignity and self-determination is not enough if "Black and Brown people
just get a sense of dignity and self-determination" without "the deserved
financial resources that support a meaningful and actual self-determina-
tion." 82 Essentially, the problem is that mediation involves telling a story,
and the way stories get communicated may perpetrate cultural myths that
operate to the disadvantage of a black employee:
(arguing that private caucus is an essential procedural element to be used in mediation of
workplace discrimination claims because it allows the mediator to cultivate racial group
presence involved in the dispute); Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in
Employment Cases Is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict Management
Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 262-65 (1998) (asserting that
mediation is being employed too late for employment discrimination by being pursued
after a charge of discrimination is filed or a lawsuit begins); Michael Z. Green, Tackling
Employment Discrimination with ADR: Does Mediation Offer a Shield for the Haves or
Real Opportunity for the Have-Nots?, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 325-26 (2005);
Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving
Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 161-64 (1999) (discussing
disadvantages of mediating sexual harassment employment claims); Michael J. Yelnosky,
Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 604-08 (1999)(discussing power imbalance concerns in mediating employment discrimination disputes
based on Title VII). Other scholars have raised concerns about mediation for minorities
and those lacking power beyond just employment discrimination matters. See Isabelle R.
Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. Disp.
RESOL. 55, 67-80 (1995) (reviewing concerns with bias and prejudice in mediation); Carol
Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Impartiality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 71,109-16 (2010) (describing biases that may affect mediation with Asian Americans); Mabry,
supra note 29, at 427-29, 457-59 (referring to dealing with prejudice from informality in
family mediation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dismantling the Master's House: Essays in
Memory of Trina Grillo: What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation, Inequality,
Teaching and Life, 81 MiNN. L. REv. 1413, 1423 (1997) (describing how mediation must
appreciate the differences of the participants based upon race and issues for others);
Sharon Press, Court-Connected Mediation and Minorities: A Report Card, 39 CAP. U. L.
REV. 819, 825-34 (2011) (referring to most of the critiques of mediation for minorities as
follows: informality of the process; minority performance in mediation; the effect of the
mediator on minorities; private versus public values).
80. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Know Justice, Know Peace: Further Reflections on Justice,
Equality, and Impartiality in Settlement Oriented and Transformative Mediations, 5 CAR-
DOZO J. CoNFLICr RESOL. 87, 88-89 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
81. Id. at 89; see also Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design
and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 881 (2002) (describing how the
Model Standards for Conduct of Mediators "suggest that mediation is based upon the prin-
ciple of self-determination"); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation:
A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775,776 (1999) (finding self-determination is a key value in mediation); Donald T. Weckstein,
In Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 501,503-04 (1997) (discussing mediator's role in providing information to foster self-
determination).
82. Gunning, supra note 80, at 89-90 (suggesting mediators take on an activist ap-
proach to rectify the problems of cultural myths).
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"Out" groups, women and minorities tend to have fewer positive cul-
tural myths within which to nest their stories. Consequently, some
conscious effort to examine the shallowness of common myths and to
create new moral codes must be made, or disadvantaged groups will
remain disadvantaged in the mediation process. Thus, when
mediators do nothing or "remain neutral," the outcome will tend to
conform with the dominant and familiar cultural myths.8 3
In a recent article, Carol Izumi explained the concerns that a mediator
may have in attempting to be impartial despite the presence of implicit
bias based upon Asian American stereotypes, such as assuming "that they
are not the targets of racial discrimination."8 Also, the "stereotype that
Asian Americans are deferential and unassertive hurts their potential to
advance in various professional fields."8 5 Relying on the work of Sarah
Burns,86 Izumi has suggested that mediators carefully consider the impact
of metaphors and figures of speech to address bias in mediation.8 7 For a
fair mediation process regarding claims based on race, the parties should
consider these factors: "selection of the third-party neutral, procedural
rules, remedial authority, allocation of costs," and consideration of power
differentials.8 8 Racial minorities should also have some right to reject the
selection of a mediator because of concerns of the employee or the em-
ployee's attorney. 89
Because mediation is a process that is driven by self-determination, all
aspects of mediation should focus on party empowerment, not mediator
or employer empowerment, especially for the party with the least bar-
gaining power: the employee. 90 Also, mediators should be selected based
upon their ability to facilitate negotiation of the dispute at issue. But
those mediators should also have the experience and cultural competence
to help facilitate communications in a race discrimination dispute involv-
ing a black employee.9 1 This does not mean that the mediator has to be of
83. Id. at 93.
84. Izumi, supra note 79, at 113.
85. Id.
86. See Sarah E. Bums, Thinking About Fairness & Achieving Balance in Mediation,
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 54 (2008).
87. Izumi, supra note 79, at 126-127.
88. Green, supra note 79, at 353-54 (citing Dennis Nolan, Labor and Employment
Arbitration: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 53 Disp. RESOL. J., 40, 46 (1998)).
89. Id. at 355.
90. Id. at 358-59.
91. See John Barkai, Cultural Dimension Interests, the Dance of Negotiation, and
Weather Forecasting: A Perspective on Cross-Cultural Negotiation and Dispute Resolution,
8 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L. J. 403, 448 (2008) (referring to how failure to allow for and under-
stand cultural dimensions in ADR "leads to frustration and resentment" where one party
may not be interested in continuing the relationship and will not follow its current terms);
John Barkai, What's a Cross-Cultural Mediator To Do? A Low-Context Solution for a
High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOzo J. CONFIcr RESOL. 43, 43-44 (2008) (discussing the
role of a mediator in cross-cultural mediation as the ability to "understand and adapt to the
cross-cultural differences of the parties and use different approaches"); Pat K. Chew, The
Pervasiveness of Culture in Conflict, 54 J. LEG. EDUC. 60, 66 (2004) (suggesting that parties
understand their own cultural dynamics in a conflict and the cultural profile of their oppo-
nents, as well as the cultural profile of the arbitrator or mediator involved, to be in position
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the same race as the person filing the discrimination claim.92 Te process
for selecting the mediator just needs to be one where a black employee
has a fair chance to select someone who may look like and understand
the experiences a black employee may face in dealing with workplace
discrimination.93 Specifically, a mediation process that provides fairness
for a race discrimination claimant should have the following components:
1) encourage, expect and provide mechanisms for employees to ob-
tain legal representation; 2) provide a critical mass of mediators of
color and women as a qualified cadre of mediators that employees of
color and female employees can realistically select to mediate their
employment discrimination disputes; 3) allow employees some role
in the design of procedures that will constitute the framework for
conducting the mediation; 4) require that mediators determine the
goals and interests of the parties in each individual dispute, and as
long as those goals do not present any ethical concerns, the mediator
should actively help the parties resolve their conflict in a way that
matches their goals; and 5) allow employees to seek additional forms
of dispute resolution relief, including the right to go to court if medi-
ation or other informal methods do not work. 94
C. ARBITRATING WHILE BLACK9 5
One of the major concerns for employees who bring race discrimina-
tion claims in arbitration is the fairness of the arbitration system. As I
to better resolve the conflict); see also Lela Love & Ellen Waldman, The Hopes and Fears
of All the Years: 30 Years Behind and the Road Ahead for the Widespread Use of Media-
tion, 31 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 123, 146 (2016) (highlighting the development of the
International Mediation Institute and one of its projects to focus on the importance of
training and certification of mediators on "inter-cultural competency"); Cynthia A. Savage,
Culture and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. GENDER & L. 269, 274 (1996) ("Defining
cultural identity as being the same as ethnicity misses certain potential similarities in cul-
ture," and the problem of "conflating 'culture' with ethnicity is that it may perpetuate
harmful and simplistic stereotypes."); Wallace Warfield, Building Consensus for Racial
Harmony in American Cities: Case Model Approach, 1996 J. DisP. RESOL. 151, 157-58
(1996) (noting that as opposed to a typical "industrial labor dispute," mediators in a "racial
conflict" can "bring their own cultural baggage . . . influencing not only what takes place in
negotiations, but shaping the outcomes as well," and they should decide whether their
intervention in the dispute "will help or hinder the progress of racial understanding").
92. See Gunning, supra note79, at 89 ("Matching parties and mediators based upon
gender or race or sexual orientation does not assure that those individuals who happen to
be members of the same identity groups will have the same perspectives"); see also Izuni,
supra note 79, at 136-39 (criticizing race matching for mediation but suggesting it might be
useful if there is also a co-mediator); Savage, supra note 91, at 274 (arguing that because
culture is not limited by ethnicity, the mediator must not rely on stereotypes that do not
focus on the real identity of the participant, as mediators and participants with the same
ethnicity may not have the same cultural identity).
93. Gunning, supra note 79, at 89 (suggesting that having a team of diverse co-
mediators can "provide symbolic and practical advantages to a mediation" and may help
participants by giving them "the perception ... their chances of being treated fairly in-
creased by having at least one mediator be from their own identity group" and "conveying
to the parties that there is at least an opportunity or possibility that one's circumstances
and experiences can be understood").
94. Green, supra note 79, at 359.
95. Several articles have addressed concerns about individuals fairly participating in
arbitration based on race. See, e.g., Green, supra note 6, at 369; Michael Z. Green, An
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have argued previously, "when arbitration agreements coerce black em-
ployees into a private dispute resolution system where employers may
apply racial stereotypes without little regulation, it raises concerns about
the integrity of that system." 96 Some empirical research has found that
black workers alleging racial harassment do not do well in the courts, and
they fare even worse in arbitration. 97 Further, "the lack of diversity in the
arbitrator pool may cause black employees not to pursue their discrimi-
nation claims out of a feeling that it would be futile in such a questionable
system." 98
In 2011, Janice Tudy-Jackson found that there is an "underutilization of
ADR by African-American communities and the underrepresentation of
African Americans as ADR providers." 99 Tudy-Jackson reviewed a
2005-2006 qualitative study of "barriers experienced by African-Ameri-
cans, Latino-Americans, and Asian-Americans in the New York City
metropolitan area as it pertains to entering, remaining, and advancing in
the ADR field." 10o Those barriers included obstacles that apply to any-
one seeking entry to or advancement within the ADR profession:
(1) a lack of clear entry points or career paths for the ADR profes-
sion; (2) ambiguity about ADR credentials; (3) a lack of mentors and
role models from the underrepresented racial and ethnic groups; (4)
a heavy reliance on volunteerism, particularly for mediators; (5) a
'[1]ack of public knowledge about ADR' generally; and (6) the domi-
nation of the ADR field by the legal profession.10 1
That study also identified specific barriers to entry for African-Ameri-
cans, Latino-Americans, and Asian-Americans, collectively, to include:
(1) the ADR profession is a gated community where it is very diffi-
cult to gain information or experience; (2) there is an "'old boys'
network" in the ADR field; (3) mediation still relies heavily on vol-
unteers who receive little or no compensation, which reminds Afri-
can-America[n]s of slavery and exploitation; (4) African-American,
Latino-American, and Asian-American families and communities
Essay Challenging the Racially Biased Selection of Arbitrators for Employment
Discrimination Claims, 4 J. Am. ARB. 1, 3-4 (2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=939452 [https://perma.cc/55QV-GZRX]; Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary
Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2004); E. Gary
Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275
(1999).
96. See Green, supra note 95, at 4.
97. See Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or
Justice Denied?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 207-08 (2011) (finding black employees
have a lower success rate in arbitration of 5.3% versus a success rate in courts of 22%).
98. See Green, supra note 95, at 4.
99. See Janice Tudy-Jackson, "Non-Traditional" Approaches to ADR Processes That
Engage African-American Communities and African-American ADR Professionals, 39
CAP. U. L. REV. 921, 930 (2011).
100. Id. at 934 (citing Maria R. Volpe et al., Barriers to Participation: Challenges Faced
by Members of Underrepresented Racial and Ethnic Groups in Entering, Remaining, and
Advancing in the ADR Field, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 122-24 (2008)).
101. Id. at 935.
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place high value on job security; and (5) client and institutional bi-
ases still exist.102
In Tudy-Jackson's assessment of the study's results, she noted that one
reason for the underutilization of ADR may be because African-Ameri-
cans may prefer collectivist or group values more than individualist
values.103
To address this concern about the lack of diversity in the arbitrator
pool, I asserted in 2005 that black employees should be able to challenge
"race-based arbitrator selections as . . . a purported violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (Section 1981)."104
This Section 1981 claim, based upon racial discrimination in the making
and enforcement of a contract to arbitrate a dispute, would balance the
fact that "the process to select the arbitrator who will [make] the Title
VII decision for black employees claiming race discrimination depends
primarily upon the unregulated and private whims of the parties, espe-
cially the party with the most bargaining power, the employer."105 Re-
gardless, "if the arbitrator selection process denies black employees the
right to have blacks as part of the pool of individuals who will decide the
employment discrimination case as arbitrators, some mechanism must be
made available to address these concerns."1 0 6
The court challenges made to the diversity of the arbitrator pool have
"fallen on deaf ears,"107 and the pool of potential decision-makers of-
fered by national arbitral organizations remains largely homogeneous. As
an example, plaintiffs in two cases unsuccessfully attempted to sue the
American Arbitration Association for failing to provide a diverse panel
of arbitrators to hear a dispute.108 The National Academy of Arbitrators
(NAA) is a non-profit organization of arbitrators-one of the most highly
regarded and experienced groups of arbitrators in the labor and employ-
ment industry. To be an NAA member, an arbitrator must have "a mini-
mum of 60 written decisions in a time period not to exceed six years." 1to
Several years ago in 2005, I conducted an informal survey by looking at
the NAA member list on its website.n 0 In that survey, which included
talking to then-current members of the NAA, I found from the website
listing of over 600 members that only twelve members were black-about
102. Id. (citing Volpe, supra note 100, at 139-42).
103. Id. at 940-41.
104. Green, supra note 95, at 4.
105. Id. at 13.
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id. at 25.
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 233 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2000); Olson
v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 876 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd 71 F.3d 877 (5th Cir.
1995).
109. NAA Membership Guidelines, THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
http://naarb.org/member-guidelines.asp [https://perma.cc/S2UD-VXQ7].
110. See Green, supra note 95, at 31-32. See Membership List, THE NATIONAL AcAD-
EMY OF ARBITRATORS, http://naarb.org/member-list.asp [https://perma.cclWK9Z-UQQZ].
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2%.111 Twelve years later in February 2017, I repeated that survey. Now
with a membership listing closer to 630 members, I found there were sev-
enteen black members-about 2.7%.112 Out of the seventeen black arbi-
trators who are members of the NAA, only three were women, and one
of the three women became a member within the last couple of years.
Unfortunately, the sad reality is that in disputes involving matters of
race discrimination brought by black employees, these employees appear
to have little chance of obtaining an arbitrator who will look like them or
have any experience with being a black employee subjected to workplace
discrimination. 11 3 Merely being of the same race as the employee partici-
pant is not a guarantee of fair treatment, as many arbitrators of different
races can have empathy for a black employee's situation and decide the
dispute fairly. 114 However, the failure of a major reputable organization
or a key service provider to provide a critical mass of black arbitrators
casts doubt about the overall integrity of the system.115 While the small
percentage of black judges in the court system might suggest that the lack
of arbitrator diversity does not represent a real problem and may even be
"the lesser of two evils" when compared with judicial diversity,1 16 the
court system is part of the public, formal process that Delgado argued
was more trustworthy than an informal ADR process back in 1985.117 As
a result, any ADR system, especially one involving arbitrators who will
decide the outcome of racial discrimination disputes, must have a suffi-
cient cadre of black arbitrators on its roster to validate the integrity of
111. Green, supra note 95, at 31-32. The website only lists names and does not have
demographic or racial information; however, I determined the number of black arbitrators
from personal knowledge and confirmed with actual members of the NAA. See id. at 31
n.131.
112. In replicating the same process from 2005 in 2017, I am not identifying the seven-
teen black arbitrators for their own privacy.
113. See William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins? The Federal Arbitration Act and Mod-
ern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 658 (2006) ("Yet the fact is that an extremely
small percentage of arbitrators are blacks, other minorities, or women. The same miniscule
representation is reflected in the membership rolls of the blue ribbon organization (the
National Academy of Arbitrators) and it is reflected on the panels established by both the
AAA and JAMS.").
114. The real importance is the symbolism "where the disputant believes that an appre-
ciation of and a respect for his minority culture" has become a part of the arbitration
process. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 95, at 1216; Green, supra note 95, at 39 n.155, 50
(arguing that racial matching of the arbitrator with the participants feeds into stereotypes
of blacks as a community "monolithic in its configuration, views, or values" and that what
is more important is the "appearance of a fair system ... demonstrated by the value of
knowing that qualified people of color will possibly be involved in the final decision and its
related processes"); see also Gunning, supra note 79, at 89 ("Diverse mediation teams may
well be able to provide symbolic and practical advantages to a mediation"); Spitko, supra
note 95, at 295-97 (referring to how minorities can be empowered by arbitration if they
have the opportunity to pick their own arbitrator who can understand their unique needs).
115. See Gould, supra note 113, at 655 (describing that the selection of arbitrators may
be an even more unsatisfactory process than selection of judges).
116. See Green, supra note 95, at 33 & n.135 (recognizing that the "federal court system
does not provide a panacea-filled critical mass of black judges either").
117. See Delgado et al., supra note 1, ar 1388.
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that system.' 18 As Professor Gould has explained, the message sent by
not having a diverse pool of arbitrators can be quite detrimental and
hostile:
A diverse pool of arbitrators-and the same holds true for the judici-
ary as well-does not ensure adjudication which is sensitive to these
concerns, but direct life experience with discrimination cannot be but
helpful in adjudication in most instances. An all or nearly-all white
and male body of arbitrators sends the same message to the parties
which is comparable to what all-white juries have done. 119
Consequently, employers have to make sure that a diverse pool of arbi-
trators is available so that the right message about the fairness of the
dispute resolution system is conveyed to the black employees expected to
use the system when they bring racial discrimination claims.
III. MERGING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION WHILE
BLACK: THE SLIGHTLY-MODIFIED PYETT
PROTOCOL ADR IN THE WORKPLACE
SOLUTION
In assessing the value of a comprehensive ADR system to resolve
workplace disputes, one can learn a great deal from a recent agreement
between a union and an employer to resolve their disputes through medi-
ation and arbitration after a recent Supreme Court decision affected their
prior dispute resolution agreements. That new agreement, with a few
slight modifications, represents an excellent example of a convergence of
all the stakeholders' interests in developing an ADR system that can also
address race discrimination issues in the workplace in a fair manner.
A. NEGOTIATION: UNIONs LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD VIA
THE PYETT PROTOCOL
According to the Supreme Court's April 1, 2009, decision in 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett,120 a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between an
employer and a union can include a provision requiring arbitration of an
employee's statutory discrimination claim that acts as a clear and unmis-
takable waiver of the employee's right to pursue that claim in court.121
The specific CBA in Pyett provided unusually clear language in a nondis-
118. Gould, supra note 113, at 656, 658 (finding "[t]he roster of available mediators and
arbitrators should be established on a non-discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, ethnic-
ity, background, experience, etc. to satisfy the parties that their interests and objectives will
be respected and fully considered" and arguing that the diversity of the arbitrators is part
of an overall "competence issue").
119. Id.
120. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
121. Id. at 260, 274 ("there is no legal basis for the Court to strike down the arbitration
clause in this CBA, which was freely negotiated ... and which clearly and unmistakably
requires respondents to arbitrate the age-discrimination claims at issue in this appeal";
"[w]e hold that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires
union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law").
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crimination clause by stating that arbitration was the "sole and exclusive
remedy" and that the arbitrator "shall apply appropriate law" in resolv-
ing explicit statutory discrimination claims:
30. NO DISCRIMINATION. There shall be no discrimination
against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed,
color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any
other characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to,
claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City
Human Rights Code,... All such claims shall be subject to the griev-
ance and arbitration procedure (Articles V and VI) as the sole and
exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate
law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination. 1 2 2
The Pyett case left one question unanswered: whether the type of clear
and unmistakable waiver in that case would preclude a discrimination
claim from being brought in court when the union refused to pursue the
claim in arbitration. The Court called it "speculation" to resolve this issue
because of factual disputes that had not been fully briefed or covered in
earlier proceedings.1 23 In his dissent, Justice David Souter asserted the
Pyett decision may have no impact due to its failure to address this issue:
"On one level, the majority opinion may have little effect, for it explicitly
reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is en-
forceable when the union controls access to and presentation of employ-
ees' claims in arbitration . . . which is usually the case. ...
One might wonder what the implications from Pyett have been as of
April 1, 2017, eight years after the decision. A review of Westlaw's Key
Cite system as of that date identified forty-five cases establishing a nega-
tive treatment of Pyett.125 Many of those cases reject the finding of a clear
and unmistakable waiver via Pyett when the CBA arbitration provision
122. Id. at 252. I consider this language "unusually clear" because it literally refers to
arbitration as the "sole and exclusive remedy" and requires that the arbitrator "shall apply
appropriate law" while stating explicit statutes to be covered, which, in my view, is unusual
language for a union and employer to agree to with respect to a nondiscrimination clause
in a collective bargaining agreement. Such unusual language supported the intent of the
parties to waive court access to remedy statutory claims. See id.
123. Id. at 273-274 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90
(2000)) ("Respondents also argue that the CBA operates as a substantive waiver of their
[statutory] rights because it not only precludes a federal lawsuit, but also allows the Union
to block arbitration of these claims. . . . [W]e are not positioned to resolve in the first
instance whether the CBA allows the Union to prevent respondents from 'effectively vindi-
cating' their 'federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum, . . . [because] [r]esolution of this
question at this juncture would be particularly inappropriate in light of our hesitation to
invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of speculation.").
124. Id. at 285 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (quoting McDonald v.
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984)).
125. Archive of Negative Treatment of 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, WEsmAw, https://
1.next.westlaw.com/SearchlHome.html (search for "556 U.S. 247"; then open "Negative
Treatment" tab) (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
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failed to specifically list the statutes at issue. 126 In interpreting Pyett, one
federal district court even noted "that an agreement to arbitrate statutory
antidiscrimination claims [must] be 'explicitly stated"' and found no exis-
tence of a clear and unmistakable waiver, as the CBA did not mention
the discrimination statute asserted.1 27
Also, in Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP,128 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the arbitration
provision did not preclude a statutory claim from being pursued in court
because the language covered only those disputes submitted to arbitra-
tion.129 Specifically, that provision stated that the arbitrator was "author-
ized only to resolve the dispute submitted to him or her." 130 Because the
dispute submitted to the arbitrator was only a contractual dispute, not a
statutory dispute, the employee was still able to pursue his statutory dis-
crimination claim in court after an arbitrator issued a decision with re-
spect to the contractual claim. 131
Finally, very few cases involve the same type of language that was pre-
sent in the CBA from Pyett, requiring specific references to statutory
claims and stating that the grievance and arbitration process would be the
sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Some of the initial New York
federal district court cases after Pyett addressed the same language and
allowed the employee to pursue a claim in court if the union did not pur-
sue the matter in arbitration.1 32 And similar to Pyett, those cases were
brought by individual employees seeking to get into court to bring their
statutory discrimination claims against their employers.1 33 The union that
was a party to the CBA containing the provisions discussed in Pyett, Ser-
vice Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 32BJ, was not a party
to these cases. 134
On February 17, 2010, SEIU Local 32BJ and the Realty Advisory
Board on Labor Relations (RAB), the employer association that repre-
sents several employers, including the one in Pyett, entered into a Post-
Pyett Protocol agreement (the Protocol)135 for handling statutory em-
ployment discrimination disputes. That Protocol was agreed to in light of
126. See, e.g., Lemieux v. City of Holyoke, 740 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 (D. Mass. 2010);
Manuele v. City of Springfield, 718 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
127. Harrell v. Kellogg Co., 892 F. Supp. 2d 716, 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
128. 649 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2011).
129. Id. at 1207.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Morris v. Temco Serv. Indus., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6194(WHP), 2010 WL
3291810, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010); Borrero v. Ruppert Hous. Co., Inc., No. 08 CV
5869(HB), 2009 WL 1748060, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009); Kravar v. Triangle Serv., Inc.,
No. 1:06-CV-07985-RJH, 2009 WL 1342595, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009).
133. See Morris, 2010 WL 3291810, at *6; Borrero, 2009 VL 1748060, at *2; Kravar,
2009 WL 1392595, at *3.
134. See Morris, 2010 WL 3291810, at *6; Borrero, 2009 WL 1748060, at *2; Kravar,
2009 WL 1392595, at *3.
135. See Terry Meginniss & Paul Salvatore, Response to an Unresolved Issue from Pyett
The NYC Real Estate Industry Protocol, in THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 65TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LA-
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the parties' differing views on the meaning of the Pyett decision.1 36 The
parties initially implemented the Protocol as a "pilot program" and after
recognizing its success, they incorporated its terms into their master
agreements at the end of 2011.137
As part of the Protocol, the parties agreed to disagree about the conse-
quences if SEIU Local 32BJ chooses not to pursue a statutory claim in
arbitration. The RAB asserts in the Protocol that all claims, including
those statutory claims not pursued by SEIU Local 32BJ, are subject to
final resolution through the arbitration procedures provided in the
CBA.s38 SEIU Local 32BJ disagrees and asserts that the CBA does not
offer provisions for the arbitration of disputes when SEIU Local 32BJ
does not pursue the dispute, and in those situations, including disputes
involving statutory claims, individual employees may pursue a court reso-
lution.139 The Protocol provides that either party can seek a resolution of
this reserved question in arbitration by giving the other party thirty days'
notice.1 40 Neither party can seek court resolution of this reserved ques-
tion.141 The parties also agree that the terms of the Protocol do not ad-
vance either party's contention as to how the reserved question should be
resolved.1 42 The Protocol begins with a detailed mediation process for
any claim that an employer violated the CBA's discrimination clause.143
Then, the Protocol provides an arbitration program for individual em-
ployees who want to pursue claims that SEIU Local 32BJ does not
pursue.144
B. MEDIATION: TIm FIRST STEP IN THE PYETT PROTOCOL
The Protocol's first step, the mediation process, is a mandatory step for
all claims of discrimination-statutory or contractual-under the parties'
CBA, whether brought by Local 32BJ or an individual employee.1 45 The
Protocol established a panel of mediators selected by the RAB and Local
32BJ from which the parties may choose.146 All costs of the mediation are
shared equally by the RAB and Local 32BJ.147 The mediators are given
the power to require production of evidence and position statements, as
well as confer separately with each party in order to vigorously pursue
BOR ch. 11, 11-1, app. at 11-7-11-10, 11-7 n.22 (Michael Z. Green ed., LexisNexis 2013)
(providing the specific details of Post-Pyett Protocol).
136. Id. at 11-7 n.22 (describing Post-Pyett Protocol, originally agreed to on Feb. 17,
2010, and incorporated into all subsequent CBAs).
137. Id. at 11-4 n.15.
138. Id. at 11-7
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 11-8.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 11-9.
145. Id. at 11-8.
146. Id. at 11-8, 11-9.
147. Id. at 11-9.
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settlement. 148 A pre-mediation conference must be scheduled within
thirty days of the mediator's appointment. 149 At the conclusion of the
mediation, the mediator may make a settlement proposal to the par-
ties.150 The mediator also has authority to order sanctions if the mediator
believes one or both of the parties failed to comply with any directives in
good faith.151
The parties' experience with the Protocol over the last few years is such
that the majority of claims are resolved in mediation.1 52 The parties have
asserted that "the Protocol's mediation is a forum where individual plain-
tiffs have a chance to tell their stories to an interested neutral party-
often, the opportunity to be heard is something the individual plaintiff
greatly values."1 53 Also, the parties have argued that their inability to
resolve the reserved question is useful to the mediation effort because
"neither party knows for certain whether the case will be litigated in a
judicial forum or in arbitration, and to the extent that this is an issue of
significance to the parties, the very uncertainty about the outcome should
provide a further incentive to settle the merits in mediation."1 54
C. ARBITRATION: THE FINAL STEP IN THE PYETT PROTOCOL
The Protocol also provides for assistance to individual employees and
employers seeking to arbitrate claims where mediation has failed and
SEIU Local 32BJ has declined to seek arbitration of the claim. 55 Despite
the parties' satisfaction with the success of the mediation provisions of
the Protocol, the RAB and SEIU Local 32BJ have "recognize[d] that
some of [the claims asserting an employer has violated the discrimination
clause in the CBA] will be litigated in some forum, and that litigation may
raise procedural issues that are of concern" to the parties.1 56 The parties
expressed concerns about situations where an individual employee de-
mands relief that is inconsistent with the CBA or where an employee
advances a construction of the CBA that neither SEIU Local 32BJ nor
the RAB believe is correct. As a result, the Protocol provides that "[i]f
148. Id. at 11-8 to 11-9. The Mediation Panel is distinct from the Contract Arbitrator
Panel. Id. at 11-8.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 11-9.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 11-5.
153. Id. at 11-5, 11-6. See also Donna Shetowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Percep-
tions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical
Study, 41 Com. L. REV. 63, 72-73 (2008) (noting that "[a]s empirical research has demon-
strated, disputants are more likely to comply voluntarily with dispute resolution outcomes
when those outcomes are produced by procedures that they perceive as fair" and also
when participants "feel respected and treated with dignity"); Nancy Welsh, Disputants' De-
cision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Jus-
tice, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 179, 187 (2002) (highlighting how "process elements-voice,
consideration, even-handedness and dignity"-are important to the participants in
mediation).
154. Meginniss & Salvatore, supra note 135, at 11-6.
155. Id. at 11-9, 11-10.
156. Id. at 11-6.
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mediation does not resolve the matter, the individual employee or em-
ployees, regardless of whether they are represented by counsel, may pur-
sue their claims as they see fit in arbitration."1 57
Under this dispute resolution program, SEIU Local 32BJ and RAB
have "elicited from the American Arbitration Association a list of arbi-
trators who (1) are attorneys, and (2) are qualified to decide employment
discrimination cases" to handle disputes that SEIU Local 32BJ declines
to pursue in arbitration.' 58 If an employee and an RAB-member em-
ployer seek arbitration of an employment discrimination claim, the list of
arbitrators will be provided to the individual employee and the RAB-
member employer. 159 The process for selecting the arbitrator and paying
the arbitrator's costs shall be decided between the employee and the
RAB employer.1 60 Any arbitration conducted shall proceed according to
the American Arbitration Association's National Rules for Employment
Disputes.161
The individual employee hearings held pursuant to this dispute resolu-
tion program may be held at the Office of Contract Arbitration used for
disputes under the CBA.1 6 2 However, it is understood that use of the Of-
fice of Contract Arbitration under this Protocol is not a forum provided
by the CBA.1 63 Also, pursuant to the Protocol, SEIU Local 32BJ will not
be a party to any individual employee arbitration pursued under the Pro-
tocol, and "the arbitrator shall not have authority to award relief that
would require amendment of the CBA or other agreement(s) between
[SEIU Local 32BJ] and the RAB or conflict with any provision of any
CBAs or other such agreement(s)."16 Finally, the Protocol concludes by
stating that "[any mediation and/or arbitration outcome shall have no
precedential value with respect to the interpretation of the CBAs or other
agreement(s) between [SEIU Local 32BJ] and the RAB."165
D. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE PYETT PROTOCOL
There are several issues that would be of concern if parties decided
they wanted to follow the Protocol's terms in developing a dispute resolu-
tion system for handling employment discrimination claims brought by
employees.
First, the Protocol's adoption of a broad mediation process to help its
diverse employees resolve statutory discrimination claims is a wonderful
response by the parties to Pyett. Professor Ann Hodges suggested many
years ago that there was a major opportunity for unions to embrace social
157. Id. at 11-5.
158. Id. at 11-9.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 11-9 to 11-10.
162. Id. at 11-10.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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justice in the workplace through negotiating an agreement to mediate
statutory employment discrimination claims.166 Unions benefit from
these arrangements because the union can create more solidarity within
its members and strengthen overall support for the union.1 67 Employees
benefit from receiving broader and more creative options to resolve
workplace disputes without having to pursue difficult litigation options
and endure poor morale in the workplace.1 68 Employers have started em-
bracing mediation on a broader level as a workplace dispute resolution
tool and the better morale and prevention of litigation also benefits em-
ployers, especially in a union environment.1 69
Second, I am admittedly already on the record as supporting the bene-
fits of an agreement to have a union pursue statutory discrimination
claims on behalf of employees in a labor arbitration process. 170 As a re-
sult, I am mostly supportive of the Protocol that the parties from the Py-
ett case have implemented with respect to providing for arbitration of
discrimination claims, especially when SEIU Local 32BJ processes those
claims and represents the worker alleging workplace discrimination.1 71
As SEIU Local 32BJ asserted in its brief in the Pyett case, the value of
providing diverse arbitrators and fair dispute resolution processes for wo-
men and people of color represents a significant motivation for establish-
ing SEIU Local 32BJ's right under the CBA to pursue statutory claims on
behalf of employees through labor arbitration:
This agreement was based on our joint commitment to diversify the
panel of arbitrators to better reflect the Union's membership, to de-
velop procedures appropriate for such cases, and to evaluate our ex-
perience in connection with these claims at the conclusion of this
agreement and in light of any subsequent court decisions.1 72
166. Ann Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69
Mo. L. REv. 365, 385-404 (2004) (describing the benefits for employees, unions, and em-
ployers to mediate employment discrimination claims).
167. Id. at 387-91.
168. Id. at 391-96.
169. Id. at 396-400.
170. Green, supra note 6, at 403-04 n.198.
171. See Michael Z. Green, A Post-Pyett Collective Bargaining Agreement to Arbitrate
Statutory Discrimination Claims: What Is It Good For-Could It Be Absolutely Nothing or
Really Something?, in THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTrIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 65TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR ch. 12, 12-1, 12-
10-12-11 (M. Green Ed. LexisNexis 2013) ("Accordingly, any agreement (including the
Post-Pyett Protocol) that continues to allow unions to pursue statutory discrimination
claims on behalf of employees as a process to value the increasingly diverse workforce has
merit and should be applauded. Furthermore, it is laudatory that the parties have found
that involving mediation as a requirement had led to satisfactory results from all those
involved.").
172. Brief of the Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 32BJ as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (No. 07-581), 2008 WL 2724312,
App. B, at *4a (quoting Letter from Michael P. Fishman, Trustee, SEIU Local 32BJ, to
James Berg, President, Realty Advisory Board (April 19, 2000)); see also Larry Engelstein
& Andrew Strom, Now That the Court Has Spoken, What's Next?, N.Y.U. LAB. & EMP. L.
NEWS, Fall 2009, at 5, 5-6 (offering comments from SEIU Local 32BJ representatives as-
serting that its agreement with the Realty Advisory Board in Pyett does not act as a clear
and unmistakable waiver, that court decisions since Pyett show that employees may still go
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This result appears to be quite favorable for bargaining unit employees,
especially given the difficulties individual employees face in resolving
their discrimination claims in the courts. Unfortunately, it is not clear why
SEIU Local 32BJ agreed to the development of the individual employee
arbitration process in the Protocol rather than just staying with the status
quo after the Pyett decision and continuing to pursue statutory claims in
arbitration when it desired. It still could have asserted that employees
could pursue relief in court when SEIU Local 32BJ declined to process
the claim. As a result of the Protocol, SEIU Local 32BJ's only involve-
ment when it has decided not to pursue arbitration will be the fact that it
helped pick the statutory arbitrator panel that is made available to the
individual employee who pursues the statutory claim in arbitration.
Unfortunately, one of the key problems for individual employees in
pursuing discrimination claims in the courts is finding legal representa-
tion.173 Black employment discrimination plaintiffs, in particular, are
much less likely to have attorneys. 174 The same concern-lack of legal
representation-is just as palpable in ADR.175 Jean Sternlight has ex-
plained the value of having a lawyer in ADR as follows:
Once the neutral is selected, the lawyer can be very helpful in coach-
ing the client in such matters as what to expect in mediation or arbi-
tration, who to bring as participants or witnesses, or what strategic
moves might be desirable in either process. In arbitration, whether
binding or non-binding, attorneys can make the same kinds of deci-
sions they make in litigation, such as which witnesses to use and
whether and how to present documentary evidence.
The strategy in mediation is a form of negotiation strategy, and great
thought should be given to how and whether to present information,
solicit information, ask questions, make apologies, or make offers/
demands. Although aspects of mediation may sometimes be confi-
dential, depending upon relevant statutes, rules and contracts, infor-
mation exchanged in mediation may nonetheless be very important
to litigation that later transpires if the dispute is not resolved. Attor-
to court if the union does not pursue the case in arbitration, and that one benefit of pursu-
ing discrimination claims in labor arbitration is that "low-wage workers often have trouble
finding employment discrimination specialists who are willing to take their cases to
court").
173. See Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes
as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
55, 64-77 (2004) (describing the pressing need for attorneys to represent employees in
discrimination claims, both in courts and in ADR).
174. Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson, & Laura Beth Nielsen, Race and Representation:
Racial Disparities in Legal Representation for Employment Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 15
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 705, 713 (2012); Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in
the Twenty-First Century: Challenges in a Changing Environment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 487, 500 (2003) (referring to difficulties for employees in finding a lawyer for discrimina-
tion claims).
175. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 381, 383-84 (2010) (lamenting that "lawyerless ADR is problematic"
and a "pervasive issue" where "the reality is that participants often do not or cannot retain
counsel").
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neys can help with these tasks. 176
Moreover, it is not clear that the mediation or arbitration process of-
fered by the Protocol provides employees with assistance in obtaining le-
gal representation to process these claims, especially when SEIU Local
32BJ will not be involved in the arbitration. While personally working
with the attorneys from the RAB and SEIU Local 32BJ on various
presentations about the Protocol, I have learned that the parties' motiva-
tions have been to provide the fairest dispute resolution process for em-
ployees covered by their CBA. Additionally, the attorneys highlighted
how much the mediation process employed by the Protocol had further
enhanced the opportunities for employees to resolve fairly their disputes
with their employers without even getting to the arbitration stage.
Some court decisions since the Protocol was adopted have required in-
dividual employees to arbitrate their claims because the court seems to
have read the Protocol as requiring arbitration.17 7 As I feared when I first
analyzed the Protocol, one of the potential consequences of providing a
procedure that specifies how individual employees may pursue mediation
and arbitration without Local 32BJ's involvement is that this action
would lead to a court finding that individual employees could not pursue
statutory discrimination claims in court, even when Local 32BJ chose not
to pursue the matter.17 8 In recent cases, New York federal district courts
have adopted this position.17 9 For example, in Germosen v. ABM Indus.
Corp., the court found that the Protocol resolved the question about what
happens when an employee attempts to pursue a statutory claim in court
after Local 32BJ does not pursue the statutory claims in arbitration. 18 0
Therein, the Court found:
[I]f Plaintiff still had unresolved statutory claims, the CBA clearly
provided him with access to an arbitral forum, either through the
Union or, if the Union chose not to arbitrate, on his own. It is his
failure to exhaust those avenues, not anything the Union did, that
renders his federal lawsuit premature. Nothing in the Amended
Complaint indicates what redress, if any, Plaintiff sought from the
176. Id. at 406; see also Brunet, supra note 8, at 45-47 (describing the importance of
legal representation in ADR); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in
Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Non-Adversarial
Setting, 14 Ono ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269, 269-70 & n.3 (1999) (suggesting the impor-
tance of lawyers being involved in mediation); Gould, supra note 113, at 659 (criticizing the
lack of attorney representation in arbitration as a problem for employees in making in-
formed decisions about the arbitrator selection process).
177. See Regonja v. Vernado Realty Trust, 159 F. Supp. 3d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Favors
v. Triangle Servs., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 197 (S.D.N.Y 2016); Germosen v. ABM Indus.
Corp., No. 13-CV-1978(EC), 2014 WL 4211347, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014).
178. See Green, supra note 171, at 12-1, 12-11 ("On the other hand, the Post-Pyett Pro-
tocol appears to agree to something that was not clearly required after Pyett and may even
end up in supporting an argument that SEIU Local 32BJ has agreed to waive an individual
employee's right to pursue statutory claims in court when the Union has declined to pursue
the claim.").
179. See Begonja, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 402; Favors, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 197; Germosen,
2014 WL 4211347, at *3.
180. Germosen, 2014 WL 4211347, at *3.
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Union with respect to his termination or his more general allegations
of workplace discrimination-and there is certainly nothing sug-
gesting that he took any efforts to pursue arbitration on his own if
and when the Union declined to act. Thus, Plaintiff's claims are sub-
ject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the terms of the CBA....
If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with those claims, he is directed to sub-
mit to the mediation and arbitration procedures contemplated by the
CBA and the Protocol.1 8 1
Another New York federal district court case covering the implications
for employees covered by the Protocol is Favors v. Triangle Services,
Inc.182 Therein, the court reviewed what it referred to as an apparent
inconsistency between the CBA's discrimination clause and the Protocol
when the Union declined to arbitrate a dispute.1 8 3 Even though the court
determined that it did not have to address the issue because the facts
suggested there was still a possibility that Local 32BJ might pursue the
claim, the court nevertheless concluded, citing Germosen, that an em-
ployee would still be required to pursue the statutory discrimination
claim through the mediation and arbitration processes under the Protocol
rather than in the courts, even if Local 32BJ chose not to bring the case
forward to arbitration.184
In Begonja v. Vornado Realty Trust, the court discussed the terms of
the Protocol and how it leaves open the "reserved question" about what
happens when Local 32BJ chooses not to pursue a statutory claim in arbi-
tration.18 5 The court noted that the RAB takes the position that the indi-
vidual employee must arbitrate the statutory claim, and Local 32BJ takes
the position that the individual employee can pursue the statutory claims
in court.18 6 However, the court also noted that Local 32BJ and the RAB
agreed in the Protocol that this unanswered and "reserved question"
would be resolved in arbitration if either Local 32BJ or the RAB initiated
it.1 87
Although the employee had not submitted her claims to arbitration
under the Protocol, the court cited other decisions-addressing essen-
tially the same CBA language and finding arbitration mandatory whether
Local 32BJ pursued the claims or not-as support for the order that
Begonja must arbitrate her statutory claims.' 88 As a result of these cases
and despite Local 32BJ's argument to the contrary, court decisions have
arguably led to a de facto finding that the mediation and arbitration pro-
cedures provided to individual employees by the Protocol have effectu-
ated a clear and unmistakable waiver of the employees' rights to pursue
181. Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted).
182. 207 F. Supp.3d 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
183. Id. at 201.
184. Id. at 203-05.
185. 159 F. Supp. 3d 402, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
186. Id. at 411.
187. Id. at 407, 410-11.
188. Id. at 411 n.8 (quoting Bouras v. Good Hope Mgmt. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 8708
(WHP), 2012 WL 3055864, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012)).
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court claims even if Local 32BJ chooses not to pursue the claims.18 9
Because of this de facto finding from the federal district courts in New
York, as described by cases like Germosen, Favors, and Begonja, the
courts have done what the parties to the Protocol had hoped the Protocol
would prevent: decided the "reserved question" of what should happen
when Local 32BJ decides not to pursue a statutory claim in arbitration. 190
As a result, my suggestion is that Local 32BJ and the RAB should seek
an arbitration resolution to address the "reserved question." This is nec-
essary because court cases such as Germosen, Favors, and Begonja ap-
pear to be providing an answer to that question despite the parties'
intention to have it resolved via arbitration. 191
Another option that would support Local 32BJ's position but would be
contrary to the RAB's position on the reserved question is to add lan-
guage to the Protocol that follows the decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Mathews.192 There, the court
found the arbitration waiver limited to those claims actually submitted to
the arbitrator by the union. 19 3 However, obtaining such language is easier
said than done, as the RAB clearly wants to address individual employ-
ees' statutory claims through the arbitration process rather than in the
courts, whether the employee pursues the claims as an individual or
through Local 32BJ. Only the parties to the Protocol will know what
tweaks to their CBA will be right for their constituencies in light of the
continued federal district court decisions interpreting the Protocol. One
should also note that it is individual employees who are bringing these
claims to the federal courts, not SEIU Local 32BJ or the RAB. If SEIU
Local 32BJ obtained any other benefits for its members not readily ascer-
tainable in agreeing to the Pyett Protocol, then those benefits should be
identified and examined.
E. SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS: DIVERSE NEUTRALS, LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPEALS
To reach the level of fairness and address concerns about prejudice, the
Post-Pyett Protocol would have to add a few slight modifications. First,
the parties would have to commit to finding a core and critical mass of
black ADR professionals to be listed both on their roster of mediators
189. See Begonja, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 402; Favors, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 197; Germosen,
2014 WL 4211347, at *3.
190. See Begonja, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 411 ("Indeed, the CBA expressly provides proce-
dures for arbitration by an individual employee in the event that the Union denies repre-
sentation. See CBA Art. XXI § 24(B)(3)."); Favors, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 197; Germosen,
2014 WL 4211347, at *3.
191. See Begonja, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 402; Favors, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 197; Germosen,
2014 WL 4211347, at *3.
192. Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, 649 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (10th Cir.
2011).
193. Id.
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and as their contract arbitrators. 194 The parties should be taking affirma-
tive steps to find and train ADR professionals of color who can serve on
their roster of mediators and their list of contract arbitrators.
Second, the parties should adopt some form of a legal service plan as
an employee benefit so that those employees who desire legal representa-
tion are allowed to find attorneys to represent them in the arbitration
process.1 95 For instance, some employers provide funds for employees to
pay for legal services.1 96 Since the SEIU Local 32BJ and the RAB pay for
the mediation, the employer and union would not have to pay for legal
representation or allow use of the legal service plan for representation in
mediation as a suggested modification.1 97 However, an employee could
be allowed to obtain an attorney to represent him during the mediation if
he pursued the legal representation at his own cost.1 9 8
Finally, some disputes should still be allowed to go to court. If the
SEIU Local 32BJ chooses not to arbitrate a dispute, but the individual
employees desire to pursue further resolution because the dispute in-
volves constitutional or public policy concerns that may be of an impor-
tant precedent-setting nature,199 the employees should be able to appeal
the matter to court.200 A court could review the arbitrator's decision
194. See Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased Selection of Arbi-
trators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. OF Am. ARB. 1, 4-5 (2005), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=939452 [http://perma.ccl55QV-GZRX].
195. See Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment
Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 341, 344-45 (2002) ("Representa-
tion is one element of dispute system design, an element that is judged to be fundamental
to fairness," and "[a]n employment dispute resolution program that promotes employee
direct participation, with any representative of his or her choice, might similarly have a
positive effect on how employment disputes get processed.").
196. See Michael Z. Green, Ethical Incentives for Employers in Adopting Legal Service
Plans to Handle Employment Disputes, 44 BRANDEIS L. J. 395, 401-04 (2006); Green,
supra note 173, at 61-62 (suggesting unions provide lawyers for helping non-union
employees).
197. See Berger, supra note 174, at 536; Green, supra note 79, at 354 n.148 (describing
situations where employers have provided legal representation for employees in an ADR
process); Green, supra note 196, at 401-04; Green, supra note 173, at 114-15.
198. See Hodges, supra note 166, at 386-87 (describing how employees may want "at-
torneys or other advocates" rather than a union for representation in mediation).
199. An example of such a case might be a sexual harassment case where "[p]ublic
vindication might be particularly important for the accuser and the accused where the alle-
gations resulted in a one on one encounter unobserved by witnesses" or "cases involving
repeated or serial harassment" where "public litigation and liability could be essential to
deter continued harassment." Id. at 424; Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. Rnv. 668, 671-72 (1986) (referring to public disputes
that warrant court resolution rather than ADR).
200. See Berger, supra note 174, at 538 (noting certain cases ought to go through trial
and appeal to create significant law to guide and bind interested persons in the future).
There are some dispute resolution processes where the parties may arbitrate a dispute and
the employee may still pursue the matter in court. See Green, supra note 79, at 356
(describing Shell's RESOLVE program, which "allows arbitration as an optional choice
where the employee may still file suit in court afterwards"). One possible result of allowing
non-binding arbitration as a form of procedural justice for employees is that attorneys may
prefer to pursue mediation instead. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We
Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, 6 DisP. REsOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15, 16-17
(discussing why lawyers may view mediation as more preferable than non-binding arbitra-
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under a de novo standard of review.201 Although an employer may balk
at opening up its arbitration process to something more than a completely
deferential review, the Supreme Court stated in a 1974 decision, Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver, that an arbitration decision can be given "great
weight" in the court proceeding if "[r]elevant factors" were present:
Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-
bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the
degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the
record with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special
competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determina-
tion gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court
may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the
issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and
decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But
courts should ever [be] mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate reso-
lution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts
to assure the full availability of this forum.202
Since the Supreme Court in Pyett allows the parties to a CBA to agree
to resolve statutory discrimination claims under its grievance and arbitra-
tion process, and it explicitly stated that it was not overruling Gardner-
Denver,203 this approach of allowing de novo review in the courts is con-
sistent with current law.2 0 4 Some employers already allow appeal of arbi-
tration decisions as part of a comprehensive and fair dispute resolution
process. 205 If the parties have established an excellent record in support
of resolving the dispute in arbitration, the de novo review, with great
weight placed on the arbitrator's decision given the relevant factors from
Gardner-Denver, should give the employer great comfort that the result
tion despite procedural justice theorists' preference for non-binding arbitration and its ini-
tial high satisfaction ratings when it was first used as part of court-connected ADR).
201. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) ("We think, therefore,
that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against
discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an em-
ployee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII. The federal court should
consider the employee's claim de novo.").
202. Id. at 60 n.21.
203. See 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 265 n.8 ("today's decision does not con-
tradict the holding in Gardner-Denver").
204. But see Mark S. Mathison & Bryan M. Seiler, What 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
Means for Employers: Balancing Interests in a Landscape of Uncertainty, 25 ABA J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 173, 185-86 (2010) (arguing that the standard for review by a court of an arbitra-
tor's decision made in compliance with the Pyett clear and unmistakable waiver process is
unclear and murky and suggesting it would be a deferential review either under Federal
Arbitration Act analysis or Labor Management Relations Act analysis).
205. Green, supra note 79, at 356 (arguing that Shell's RESOLVE dispute resolution
program, focused on mediation but also allowing for arbitration while providing the em-
ployee the right to appeal the arbitration decision in court, is just the "type of program
[that] can allow a fair and quick result" for "those rare situations where a public and for-
mal adjudication is necessary," and this system provides court access for "an employee who
needs that formal judicial forum to obtain justice").
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will likely be affirmed on appeal. 206 But in those rare circumstances
where an important court precedent must be set, the employee will be
able to seek court resolution. Professor William Gould has suggested how
such an arbitration procedure might work based upon an arbitration he
conducted many years before the Gardner-Denver decision:
I was appointed as an arbitrator in two of the early cases:
Weyerhauser Co., which involved a special procedure negotiated in
advance of Gardner-Denver, and Basic Vegetable Products Com-
pany Inc., which may have been the first such procedure. A concilia-
tion settlement agreement was part of the submission along with the
collective bargaining agreement; though the union represented the
grievant, "the individual grievant [was] also represented by counsel
of her own choosing because there [were] alleged violations of Title
VII" and the conciliation and settlement agreements called for such
representation. What was particularly interesting about Basic Vege-
table was that it provided for third-party representation by the indi-
vidual in his own right along with the union and employer lawyers.
This seemed to be a proper response to the Gardner-Denver Court's
footnote nineteen reference to the fact that traditional arbitration's
"manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented [is]
a further concern [when] the union [possesses] exclusive of
control. "207
IV. DISPUTING WHILE BLACK AT WORK MATTERS
Several years ago, Professor Derrick Bell suggested a quite masterful
approach to developing mechanisms to achieve racial justice: "The inter-
est of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when
it converges with the interests of whites." 208 The Pyett Protocol, as modi-
fied in this Article, is consistent with Bell's interest-convergence thesis; it
attempts to address all the interests of the key players in workplace dis-
pute resolution: unions, workers, and employers.209 All of these groups
have an interest in not letting racial hostilities in the workplace become a
major problem. Providing a comprehensive dispute resolution process
that offers quick and effective resolution of disputes can resonate and
converge with the interests of all the key stakeholders.
206. See Gardner-Denver, supra note 201, at 60 n.21.
207. Gould, supra note 113, at 627-28.
208. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); see also Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise
and Fall of African American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 369, 371 (2002) (noting "an impressive insight by Derrick Bell
that gains for blacks coincide with white self-interest and materialize at times when elite
groups need a breakthrough for African Americans, usually for the sake of world appear-
ances or the imperatives of international competition").
209. See Bell, supra note 208.
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A. BLACK LivEs MATTER AT WORK: MAKING THE LABOR
MOVEMENT GREAT AGAIN
In some Black Lives Matter at Work materials, there is a statement
made by Martese Chism, RN Case Manager at John H. Stroger, Jr. Hos-
pital of Cook County, Chicago that captures the importance of organized
black labor joining with the Black Lives Matter movement: "If the Labor
Movement wants to be great again, the Labor Movement must under-
stand that Black Lives Matter. Either we all fight together, or we all get
destroyed together." 210 By negotiating the terms of a dispute resolution
process that embraces racial justice concerns, unions can deliver a lifeline
to their black workers given the increasingly diverse private sector work-
place.2 11 Black workers tend to favor unions more than any other work-
ers. 2 1 2 High levels of union representation correlate with better access to
justice. 213
However, as of 2016, a little less than 11% of the United States
workforce, and a little more than 6% of the private sector workforce, is
unionized. 214 Nevertheless, unions, such as Unite Here in Philadelphia,
have actively embraced the synergies between union representation and
concerns about the plight of black workers through Black Lives Mat-
ter.2 1 5 In recognizing the power of the Black Lives Matter movement,
unions can provide black workers with a valuable ally who can effectively
210. Greg Chern, Black Lives Matter at Work: New Report Offers Resources for Labor
Activists to Fight White Supremacy, WORKING IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), http://in-
thesetimes.comlworking/entry/18447/black-lives-matter-labor-movement [https://perma.cc/
HSX8-DMS8].
211. See id.; Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313, 1330-34
(2002); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1767,
1834-46 (2001) (proposing reforms to encourage unions to embrace racial justice and fight
employment discrimination on behalf of employees); Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong,
So Closely Intertwined: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135,
1174-1209 (2013) (suggesting synergies between unions and workers of color); Green,
supra note 6, at 368-71, 405-08 (describing opportunities for racial justice in the workplace
and the need for unions to capitalize on increasing diversity in the workplace); Green,
supra note 173, at 77-100 (discussing opportunities and the need for unions to embrace
racial justice); Rev. Terry L. Melvin, Black Lives Matter to Labor, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-terry-1-melvin/black-lives-matter-to-
lab_b 6770384.html [https://perma.cc/D6AL-A27F] (commentary by President of Coali-
tion of Black Trade Union affirming Black Lives Matter movement is important to organ-
ized labor while describing how union density has steadily decreased and wage gap has
increased).
212. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., ECON. NEWS RELEASE, UNION
MEMBERS 2016 (Jan. 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ELL-26E8] ("Black workers were more likely to be union members than
were White, Asian, or Hispanic workers").
213. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Rule of Law Goes to Work: How Collective
Bargaining May Promote Access to Justice in the United States, Canada, and the Rest of the
World, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 211, 226-227 (2014) (matching high union den-
sity rates with high levels of access to justice).
214. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., supra note 212 (finding 10.7% unionization in the U.S. and
6.4% in the private sector).
215. See Black Work Matters: Race, Poverty and the Future of Work in Philadelphia,
UNrTE HERE PHILLY at 5, 10-13, https://www.uniteherephilly.org/wp-content/uploads/
Black-Work-Matters-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CAM-PE93] (last visited Sept. 10,
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bargain with an employer to provide a fair ADR system that circumvents
typical concerns of prejudice. Also, general concerns about lack of infor-
mation or bargaining power, or limits from stereotype threat or covering
that present obstacles for workers negotiating while black on an individ-
ual basis-can be overcome by bargaining on a collective basis.216
B. PROVIDING DisprTrE MECHANISMS TO GIVE VOICE MATTERS
To BLACK WORKERS
With the current Black Lives Matter climate affecting the workplace,
black workers are looking for more voice in expressing their concerns
about racial matters.217 Scholars have noted the importance of voice for
workers and called for more comprehensive workplace law reform to en-
courage more worker voice.218 A desire for voice also feeds into a desire
for procedural justice, which "is concerned with fairness of procedures or
processes that are used to arrive at outcomes." 219 Specifically, the "op-
portunity for voice" or for parties to "tell their stories themselves" affects
how the parties perceive the procedural justice components of a dispute
resolution system.220 In a comprehensive study of worker interests pub-
lished in 1999, Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that most work-
ers want a voice in the workplace.221 Also, their study found that most
workers want a cooperative management-employee structure, not neces-
sarily an adversarial one involving a union, where disputes are resolved
2017) (discussing issues for workers in Philadelphia based upon race and the need for im-
proved wages and conditions through union representation).
216. See Schneider et al., supra note 78, at 382 (discussing a strategy to defeat stereo-
type threat by shifting negotiation from a focus on individual approaches to group
approaches).
217. See Khanh Ho, Microaggressions in the Workplace: Black Lives Matter and Politi-
cally Correct Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
khanh-ho/microaggressions-in-the-w b_8265564.html [https://perma.cc/D65F-TBCX]
(describing how most black persons in the workplace feel uncomfortable protesting racism
until they feel like they have nothing left to lose, like the Black Lives Matter Movement,
and whether the response that All Lives Matter represents a racist statement made as part
of a growing backlash to the Black Lives Matter movement).
218. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 17, at 800-09; see also Yuval Feldman et al.,
What Workers Really Want: Voice, Unions, and Personal Contacts, 15 EMPLOYEE RTs. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 237 (2011). But see Harry G. Hutchison, What Workers Want or What Labor
Experts Want Them to Want?, 26 QuINNrPLAc L. REv. 799, 816 (2008) (discussing "skepti-
cism" regarding studies that assert employees want more voice without asking what they
would give up in return).
219. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got
to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817 (2001).
220. Id. at 820-828, 835.
221. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 135-36, 150-55
(1999) (describing statistical results from a study of workers and their desires and finding
they want more voice in the workplace and would be amenable to some form of represen-
tation in dealing with their employers, possibly through an employee committee, although
not necessarily by a union); see Hutchison, supra note 218, at 816 (quoting Richard Free-
man & Joel Rogers, WHAT WORKERS WANT 184 (2d ed. 2006)) [hereinafter Freeman &
Rogers, 2d ed.] (stating "[t]here is a major gap in America between what workers want by
way of democratic say at their workplace and what they have.").
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through arbitration.222
Having "union representation" in ADR can have "benefits for both the
employee and the employer." 223 The benefits of union representation in
ADR include "higher settlement rates for both complainants and respon-
dents and higher satisfaction levels for complainants than occurs with
other types of representatives." 2 2 4 Racial identity caucuses within a union
can further help address the fairness of the dispute resolution process. 225
Social science research suggests that allowing employees to signal their
racial identification and maintain their racial subgroup identity results in
a reduction of prejudice in the workplace.226 As a result, "members of
race-based . . . workplace identity committees can reap significant bene-
fits from group identification. "227
C. RESOLVING BLACK WORKER DISPUTES MATTERS TO EMPLOYERS
Due to a concern for diversity in their ranks, corporations have a
strong interest in rooting out workplace discrimination. 228 Employers
want to adopt informal dispute resolution systems to address discrimina-
tion concerns while also fostering a more productive workplace. 229 A re-
222. Hutchinson, supra note 218, at 814 (quoting Freeman & Rogers, 2d ed., supra note
221, at 27 (stating "the institution that appeals to most workers, whether they want a union
or not, is an independent workplace committee to represent them in workplace
decisions.")).
223. Bingham et al., supra note 195, at 376.
224. Id. at 377 (suggesting that private sector employers should "rethink opposition to
some form of union participation in employment dispute resolution" given the benefits
presented to both employees and employers).
225. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4
UC IRVINE L. REV. 561, 581-582 (2014) (describing the value of identity caucuses in ad-
dressing workplace discrimination); Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race and Gen-
der Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 79, 102-110, 153-63
(2002) (arguing for greater role for racial identity caucuses within existing union and labor
law structure); Molly S. Mcusic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in
the Workplace, 82 IowA L. REV. 1339, 1367-73 (1997) (suggesting opportunity for solidar-
ity along with difference via identity caucuses within unions); see also Hodges, supra note
166, at 389 (suggesting benefits of using union identity caucuses to help employees of color
in processing disputes via ADR); Michael J. Yelnosky, supra note 79, at 613-21 (sug-
gesting employee identity caucuses level the playing field in employment discrimination
mediations).
226. See Green, supra note 75, at 387 ("Taken as a whole, the research reveals the
importance of maintaining subgroup identity for reducing prejudice and suggests that
greater and more generalized reduction in prejudice will be gained from workplace contact
if women and people of color are permitted to signal identification with gender and racial
categories."); see also Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Divided Ranks: Privilege and
the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1542, 1617-1620 (1999) (suggesting value
of identity group representation for employees, including groups that work from within the
labor movement and some that could work outside of the labor movement with some labor
law reforms).
227. See Calhoun, supra note 9, at 209.
228. See Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VI After Forty
Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 How. L.J. 937, 959-63 (2005).
229. See Green, supra note 6, at 376 n.41 (citing Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal
Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 497, 508, 511-12, 519 (1993)) ("describing how employers' efforts to adopt informal
grievance procedures to resolve employment discrimination complaints do attempt to ad-
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cent blog entry noted that two major businesses, AT&T and Ben &
Jerry's, had taken stances in support of the Black Lives Matter move-
ment.230 With respect to Ben & Jerry's, the company established a Black
Lives Matter web page where it not only explained "Why Black Lives
Matter" but it also asked that people try to understand experiences of
those that are different and recognize the existence of systemic discrimi-
nation.231 With respect to AT&T, Chief Executive Officer Randall Ste-
phenson gave a keynote speech on diversity and inclusion to AT&T
employees and discussed the importance of the Black Lives Matter move-
ment, and also explained his views as to why a response that All Lives
Matter is inappropriate. 232 Other companies have also taken steps to
come out in favor of the Black Lives Matter Movement and other work-
place discussions about racial unrest. 2 3 3
dress legal concerns while they also subsume the legal concerns in support of manage-
ment's interests as well as they 'minimize the intrusion of law on the smooth and efficient
functioning of the organization"').
230. See Nicole Cozier, Black Lives Matter at Work as Much as Everywhere Else:
AT&T and Ben & Jerry's Set Example, Hum. RTs. CAMPAIGN (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www
.hrc.org/blog/black-lives-matter-at-work-as-much-as-everywhere-else-att-and-ben-jerrys-se
[https://perma.cc/Z9M8-NLOK].
231. See Ellen Powell, Ben and Jerry's Back Black Lives Matter: Do Ice Cream and
Politics Mix?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.csmonitor
.com/USA/Politics/2016/1008/Ben-and-Jerry-s-back-Black-Lives-Matter-Do-ice-cream-
and-politics-mix [https://perma.cc/26Z7-GLMQ]; Black Lives Matter, BEN & JERRY'S (Oct.
6, 2016), http://www.benjerry.com/whats-new/2016/why-black-lives-matter [https://perma
.cc/HF4N-C2JE].
232. See Joshua Fields, AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson Addresses the Racial Tension
in American Society, YOUTUBE (Sep. 24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Th074-
oFtO [https://perma.cc/NX7K-NDZ7]; Sabriya Rice, Citing Black Lives Matter, AT&T
CEO Urges Employees to Have Difficult Conversations About Race, DALLAS MORNING
NEws (Sep. 30, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/att/2016/09/30/citing-black-
lives-matter-att-ceo-urges-employees-difficult-conversations-race [https://perma.cc/2ZRH-
A648].
233. See Antonio J. Newell, Facebook Solidarity: Company Shows "Black Lives Matter"
Support in a Big Way, Google Too, INQUISITR (July 9, 2016), http://www.inquisitr.com/
3290595/facebook-solidarity-for-black-lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc/ZC7Y-5Y8H] (dis-
cussing CEO Mark Zuckerberg's replacement of regular signage at Facebook with Black
Lives Matter signage in response to the shooting of a black male by police in Minnesota
and also mentioning Google's twitter response to the same shooting and mentioning Black
Lives Matter); Guynn, supra note 26 (describing how Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
responded forcefully after employees crossed out "Black Lives Matter" and wrote "All
Lives Matter" on the walls of the company's campus, launching an investigation and stating
that those communications represent a "deeply hurtful and tiresome experience for the
black community"); Lily Workneh, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz Takes Powerful Step to
Discuss Race With Employees HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2014, 9:59 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/17/starbucks-howard-schultz-race_n_6344164.html [https://per
ma.cc/8C9D-FLLQ]; A Conversation with Starbucks Partners About Race in America (Dec.
17, 2014), https://news.starbucks.com/news/schultz-begins-a-conversation-with-starbucks-
partners-about-racial-issues [https://perma.ccl3ZYF-RHLE] (discussing conversations held
by CEO Howard Schultz with Starbucks workers about racial tension and unrest after
Ferguson, Missouri protests).
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V. CONCLUSION: PREJUDICE IN ADR STILL MERITS
CONSIDERATION AT WORK
With heightened realities about racial disputes in the workplace arising
in the current Black Lives Matter climate, this Article assessed each of
the traditional segments of ADR, including negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration, to determine the best approach to assist black workers. In
recognizing the fallacy of romanticizing litigation as a panacea to resolve
workplace discrimination matters based upon unfair racial treatment and
the dismal prospects black workers face in the courts,234 this Article seeks
to establish a new common ground where a union-negotiated merger of
mediation and arbitration processes can provide workplace justice with-
out prejudice using ADR, a process where all stakeholders can embrace
their shared values, and their common interests can converge.
By following the Protocol, with some slight modifications established
by a high-profile agreement between an employer and a union to provide
a dispute resolution process to help its diverse employees resolve work-
place disputes, this Article has asserted that black employees can find
racial justice through the use of ADR in the workplace. The concerns
about informality and prejudice that Delgado and his co-authors first ex-
pressed in 1985 may be addressed in four ways through the modified
merger of mediation and arbitration, as described in the Protocol.
First, the union can negotiate fairly the dispute resolution process
through its collective bargaining power, especially with identity caucuses
negotiating the parameters of any comprehensive dispute resolution pro-
gram to ensure that black workers' voices are heard.2 3 5 Second, using a
mediation process with the opportunity for diverse mediators who are
aware of cultural matters and have the competency to facilitate communi-
cation within a heightened racial climate, provides black employees with
a unique process to navigate traditional stereotypes that hinder fair work-
place solutions. Third, the ADR process culminates with a detailed arbi-
tration process that both (i) provides a cadre of diverse professionals to
serve as potential decision makers and (ii) offers employees fair legal rep-
resentation. Finally, as a last matter of procedural justice and allowing
voices to be heard as broadly as needed, employees can still go to court
with important precedential claims that demand a formal resolution.
234. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669 (1995) (refer-
ring to critics of ADR as having romanticized views of the value of litigation rather than
considering the real problems posed by litigation).
235. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 226, at 1617 n.374 (identifying several identity
groups affiliated with AFL-CIO, including the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists and the
A. Phillip Randolph Institute, which seeks racial equality through unionism). The AFL-
CIO has established many constituency groups based on identity. See AFL-CIO Constitu-
ency Groups, A. PmLLrP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, http://www.apri.orglafl-constituency-groups
.html [https://perma.cc/7FHZ-L372] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (listing A. Philip Randolph
Institute, Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, Coa-
lition of Labor Union Women, Labor Council for Latin American Advancement, and
Pride at Work).
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The overall concerns of prejudice in ADR, based upon the informality
of ADR systems, can only be evaluated in the context of the results and
processes also available in the formal court system. Unless there is a sys-
tem of collective representation, either formalized by a union or infor-
mally via some group similar to an identity caucus, the ADR system in
place for a particular employer and its employees may face the same
prejudice concerns that Richard Delgado expressed in his 1985 Article. 236
But if the formal court system represents even greater levels of inequal-
ity, then black employees may experience less prejudice through the use
of ADR for resolving discrimination claims, even if they do not have the
overall bargaining power to shape the terms of the system as they would
if a union or identity caucus negotiated on their behalf. With the changing
racial climate in our society and in the workplace, as exemplified by the
Black Lives Matter movement, more negative responses to limit the pro-
tections of the formal court system will likely occur. As a result, any
ADR system that is being used in the workplace to resolve black employ-
ees' discrimination claims must continue to be evaluated in light of the
prejudice involved therein while being compared with the prejudice
presented in pursuing resolution of those claims through the courts.
236. Delgado et al., supra note 1, at 1375-91; see Mabry, supra note 29, at 434 (finding
"African Americans tend to be collectivists while white Americans tend to be individual-
ists"); Tudy-Jackson, supra note 99, at 940-41 ("African-Americans may prefer collectivist
or group values more than individualist values.").
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